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Militant Covering 
Brandon Paradise  
INTRODUCTION 
In his now historic campaign address on race, ―A More Perfect 
Union,‖ President Obama pointed toward a new and effective black 
politics in America. In contrast to the antagonistic, ―Us‖ v. ―Them‖ 
tone that has sometimes characterized demands for racial justice, 
President Obama stated that for blacks the:  
path [forward] means . . . continuing to insist on a full measure 
of justice in every aspect of American life. But it also means 
binding our particular grievances—for better health care, and 
better schools, and better jobs—to the larger aspirations of all 
Americans—the white woman struggling to break the glass 
ceiling, the white man whose [sic] been laid off, the immigrant 
trying to feed his family.
1
 
By these words, Obama did not urge blacks to forget their particular 
grievances; however, he urged blacks to adopt a pluralistic politics of 
group power that pursues black interests within a framework that has 
the potential to appeal to a wide range of other Americans.
2
 
Instead of taking as its chief focus the development of an effective 
black pluralist politics reflecting President Obama‘s vision, this 
Article seeks to render clear how a distortion in the values of the 
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 1. Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union, Address at the National Constitution Center 
(Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.barackobama.com/2008/03/18/remarks_of_senator_ 
barack_obam_53.php. 
 2. See id.  
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black power era presents an obstacle to realizing such a politics.
3
 In 
particular, by examining a discourse in the legal academy (described 
by Professor Richard Ford as ―rights-to-difference discourse‖4) 
concerning whether antidiscrimination law should provide, in some 
contexts, what would be a right to blackness, this Article illuminates 
how the cultural legacy of black power—black pride in black 
identity—has taken precedence over what was black power‘s 
organizing and governing goal: increasing black power.
5
 Moreover, 
 
 3. This Article‘s chief focus is addressing an impediment to a politics that pursues black 
interests within a widely appealing framework. As such, theorizing such a politics is not the 
priority here. In a manuscript, which should soon be published, I offer a detailed interpretation 
of Obama‘s racial politics and explain that some critics have erroneously characterized 
Obama‘s campaign and politics as postracial. In particular, I offer a racially progressive 
interpretation of Obama‘s racial politics and explain why it is essential for progressives to focus 
on promoting a constructive, non-postracial understanding of Obama‘s politics. 
 4. Ford describes ―rights-to-difference discourse‖ as ―arguments hold[ing] that a just 
society could and should prohibit discrimination on the basis of [sic] the cultural difference 
(thereby establishing a ‗―right-to-difference‘) for the same reasons it should prohibit 
discrimination based on statuses such as race.‖ RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: 
A CRITIQUE 4 (2005).  
 Importantly, Barbara Flagg has cogently criticized Ford‘s account of ―rights-to-difference‖ 
discourse. She has specifically taken issue with Ford characterizing ―rights-to-difference 
proponents . . . [as subscribing to] a relatively sharp distinction between mainstream and 
minority cultures (cultural distinctiveness), and . . . [arguing] that such proponents must believe 
in the unitary (‗authentic‘) nature of any given minority culture (cultural essentialism).‖ Barbara 
J. Flagg, An Essay for Keisha (and A Response to Professor Ford), 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL‘Y 179, 182 (2007). She has also indicated that she does not ―think there is much fit at all 
between [Ford‘s] account of ‗rights-to-difference‘ proponents and [her] work.‖ Id. at 180. Flagg 
also has noted: 
[O]ne could adopt a vision of multiculturalism that understands cultural difference as 
fluid, overlapping, and contingent (as does Ford himself). He fails to support either the 
descriptive claim that all proponents of cultural rights adopt the more rigid, categorical 
conception of cultural difference, or the normative claim that any rights-to-difference 
proposal would require such a conception. Along similar lines, it clearly is possible to 
conceive of culture as a set of social practices, norms, and ideologies that are internally 
varied, partially inconsistent, and sometimes contested. 
Id. at 182 (footnotes omitted). I fully agree with Flagg‘s position that proponents of difference 
need not subscribe to a ―rigid, categorical conception of cultural difference,‖ and my use of the 
term ―rights-to-difference discourse‖ should be understood as including a fluid conception of 
cultural difference. Id. Moreover, notwithstanding her disagreements with Ford‘s 
characterization of her position, Flagg has herself described her arguments as constituting some 
variety of ―rights-to-difference.‖ Id. at 198 (noting that her proposals do constitute ―some 
variety of ‗right to difference,‘ though . . . not the variety Ford describes‖). 
 5. Because this Article is not chiefly concerned with black power and its various 
articulations, it does not take up the task of carefully differentiating between black power‘s 
pluralist and nationalist conceptions. It is limited and borrows from all instantiations of black 
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in addition to posing an obstacle to an effective pluralist politics 
directed toward serving black interests, the distortion of black 
power‘s values has resulted in an emphasis on achieving acceptance 
of blackness and a failure to appreciate how black instrumental 
conformity to white norms can be consistent with increasing black 
power, economically and politically as well as individually and 
communally.  
In contrast to rights-to-difference discourse, which conceives of 
the assertion of black identity primarily as a psychological event and 
the suppression of blackness primarily as a symptom of racial 
subordination, and which focuses on legally protecting displays of 
blackness in the interests of multiculturalism, individual authenticity, 
combating racial subordination, or enabling black identity to function 
as a symbol of resistance to assimilation, this Article urges a 
circumstantial comparison of the relative costs and benefits of 
displaying blackness in light of a self-conscious and substantive (as 
opposed to merely symbolic) politics of empowering black people. 
Blacks who possess political commitments to the black community 
but tactically cover
6
 blackness to succeed in mainstream endeavors 
engage in what the Article terms ―militant covering,‖ which stands in 
sharp contrast to rights-to-difference discourse‘s emphasis on 
downplaying racial difference as a symptom of subordination rather 
than as a struggle against racial inequality.
7
 
 
power their governing goal—increasing the power wielded by the black community. See 
generally IS IT NATION TIME? CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON BLACK POWER AND BLACK 
NATIONALISM (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. ed., 2002); STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. 
HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1967); WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, 
NEW DAY IN BABYLON: THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN CULTURE, 1965–75 
(1992). 
 6. The term ―covering,‖ coined by sociologist Erving Goffman, has been recently 
popularized by law professor Kenji Yoshino. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 
772 (2002) (noting that Goffman invented the term and concept of covering). It describes the 
act of deemphasizing a stigmatized trait, such as ―blackness,‖ so that ―the underlying identity is 
neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed,‖ making it easier for others to disattend the 
stigmatized trait. Id. at 772. 
 7. Although arguably not within rights-to-difference discourse because it does not focus 
on whether to legally proscribe discrimination based on cultural difference, Devon Carbado and 
Mitu Gulati‘s article, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000), uses the term 
―working identity‖ to describe the ―coping mechanisms‖ that outsiders use to counteract 
workplace discrimination and stereotyping. Id. at 1262. In their terminology, these coping 
mechanisms include ―passing‖ (where an ―outsider pretends to be an insider‖) and ―partial 
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Fundamental to militant covering is the understanding that when 
racism is viewed from a larger historical and structural perspective, it 
is clear that refusing to cover in response to the racist demands of any 
contemporary individual or group is not necessarily a significant act 
of resistance or the wisest tactical deployment of resources in the 
larger struggle to overcome the tragic legacy of racism. Militant 
covering is therefore presented as a method of gaining access to the 
economic and social capital that is critical to improving the 
circumstances of black people.  
The argument of the Article will begin by briefly describing how 
black identity functions within the politics of black power. It will 
then turn to a description of the ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse. The 
intention in this portion of the Article will be to capture how law 
professors Barbara Flagg, Kenji Yoshino, and Richard Ford‘s 
approach to ―rights-to-difference‖ exemplifies how, distinct from 
black power‘s emphasis on the expression of black cultural traits as a 
basis for the political empowerment of blacks as a group, expressing 
blackness is now the subject of a debate concerning whether 
individual blacks ought to be legally protected from the 
psychological harms associated with conforming to white cultural 
 
passing‖ (―actions that make the outsider ‗one of the guys,‘ despite his outsider status‖). Id. at 
1300–03. According to Carbado and Gulati, their partial passing is similar to Yoshino‘s 
―covering.‖ Id. at 1304 n.125. Although Carbado and Gulati acknowledge, as does Yoshino, see 
discussion infra p. 201 on attorney Lawrence Mungin, that some minorities attempt to combat 
negative stereotypes through covering strategies, they, like Yoshino, see discussion infra pp. 
202–05, focus on the costs associated with such strategies, instead of focusing on how such 
strategies can constitute a struggle against racial subordination. Carbado & Gulati, supra, at 
1277 (noting that covering strategies give rise to opportunity costs (the extra work entails a 
tradeoff), psychic costs (they are self-denying and self-negating), and risk costs (they can 
backfire)). Indeed, Carbado and Gulati describe as ―victims [those] who do identity work to 
prevent employment discrimination and preempt stereotyping.‖ Id. at 1262. While this Article 
acknowledges the costs associated with strategic covering, see discussion infra pp. 172–74, it is 
focused on achieving recognition of circumstantial ―militant covering‖ as a viable and self-
conscious political act that may be engaged in by those who refuse to be victims, ―while the 
primary project of [Carbado and Gulati‘s Working Identity] is to flesh out the kinds of work 
outsiders often feel pressured to do because of negative assumptions about their identities.‖ 
Carbado & Gulati, supra, at 1262.  
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norms and the racial subordination that pressures blacks to discard 
black cultural traits.
8
 
 
 8. While this Article focuses on a trio of rights-to-difference theorists—Flagg, Yoshino, 
and Ford—whose work together captures the core of the rights-to-difference debate, and the 
arguments essential to this Article, a number of other scholars have made important 
contributions to the literature. Compare Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for 
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995); FORD, supra note 
4; Yoshino, supra note 6; and KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR 
CIVIL RIGHTS (paperback ed. 2007); with Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating 
“National Origin” Discrimination under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 867–68 
(1994) (―[A]spects of our identities with which we are born, or that develop as a result of our 
families, do not become less important because we choose to, or must, maintain them. Nor are 
aspects of our identities less important because we have chosen them, if we have ability to 
choose. . . . The same thing [employer enforced white supremacy excluding persons of color 
from workforces or relegating them to subservient positions] happens now with respect to 
ethnic traits, in the absence of explicit [Title VII] statutory protection.‖) (footnotes omitted); 
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 365, 391–93 (1991) (―The writings of black women confirm the centrality of hair in 
the psychological abuse of black women . . . What links Afro or natural hairstyles and so-called 
‗artificial‘ ones (such as braids), is a question of assimilation. Blacks who challenge the status 
quo, especially its dominant cultural manifestations, are identified as major threats to central 
national values. Those who do not exercise volition in favor of such values are seen as having 
the stereotypical characteristics commonly associated with black will and willpower—
undisciplined, insubordinate, unwilling to melt. Blacks are thus the cause of their low 
socioeconomic status rather than victims of that status. . . . What appears to be merely an 
aesthetic judgment [to wear cornrows] is part of the subordination of black women and is 
inextricably connected to the more obvious economic judgments reflected in other cases that 
affect black women.‖ (citing Rogers Renee Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)) (footnotes omitted); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black 
Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719–28 (2001) (arguing that identity performances 
(acts of covering) are workplace discrimination because they burden ―some employees (e.g., 
blacks) more than others (e.g., whites),‖ that identity performances are a problem ―compounded 
by the fact that [such] performances constitute work, a kind of ‗shadow work‘ . . . [that] can be 
at odds with the employee‘s sense of her identity,‖ that ―[t]o the extent the employee‘s 
continued existence and success in the workplace is contingent upon her behaving in ways that 
operate as a denial of self, there is continual harm to that employee‘s dignity,‖ and that Title VII 
protection against racial discrimination can be understood to encompass situations in which 
employers differentiate ―between black people who do (or whom the firm perceives as 
performing) identity work to fit in at the firm and black people who do not perform (or whom 
the firm perceives as not performing) such work‖; and Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: 
Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1329, 1400 (1991) (―Title VII should prohibit accent discrimination‖. . . . ―In arguing for 
accent tolerance, the rationale of accent as immutable is thus a dangerous one [because it feeds 
into a hierarchy that privileges ‗the core group of the entitled‘]. A more progressive argument is 
that even if accent is changeable, no citizen should have to alter core parts of identity in order to 
participate in society. A true antisubordination agenda would apply reasonable accommodation 
to all differences, whether chosen or immutable, that are historically subject to exploitation or 
oppression by dominant groups.‖). While these scholars‘ contributions develop in important 
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Following this discussion, the Article undertakes an examination 
of Barack Obama‘s presidential campaign, which is argued to be a 
nationally accessible example of a black man‘s successful and 
tactical ―covering‖ in pursuit of power. From Obama‘s successful 
presidential campaign and coalition building, I seek to support the 
Article‘s major claim: that militant covering can be an effective 
means of obtaining both individual black success and building a 
black pluralist politics directed to securing black America‘s place in 
American society.
9
 
Having described the usefulness of covering for Obama‘s 
successful presidential bid, I will then describe how the ―rights-to-
difference‖ literature‘s focus on the harms associated with covering 
black traits neglects to emphasize: (1) that tactical, militant covering 
can be a viable strategy directed toward improving the circumstances 
of individual blacks and black people, and so can support a politics of 
black empowerment; and (2) that those who self-consciously engage 
in militant covering are not necessarily best understood as victims of 
racism, and can instead be understood as engaged in a method of 
fighting racial subordination. The basic point in this portion of the 
Article is that ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse‘s emphasis on the 
injuries and costs of covering fails to appreciate the connection 
between covering and power.  
Before beginning the argument, three provisos are appropriate. 
First, in contrast to ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse‘s concern with 
the normative wrongfulness of particular covering demands, this 
Article casts such questions of normativity aside in favor of focusing 
on covering as a source of empowerment. While militant covering 
acknowledges that a world without covering demands would be 
normatively better than the one in which we find ourselves, it 
understands that such is not the world in which we live. Accordingly, 
rather than focusing on the wrongfulness of covering demands, 
militant covering represents a pragmatic response to unfair 
circumstances that seeks the normative end of empowering black 
people. In particular, militant covering acknowledges the difficulties 
 
ways the ―rights-to-difference‖ literature, their works do not require alteration of the position 
taken in this Article.  
 9. See infra note 29. 
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and psychological strain of covering but understands that blacks who 
value their blackness can militantly shoulder these burdens in order to 
facilitate their individual success and to increase the power wielded 
by the black community.
10
  
Second, this Article maintains that political commitment to the 
black community is distinct from how individual blacks publicly 
identify with blackness. Along with maintaining the analytical 
 
 10. In the context of discussing minority membership in the corporate bar, Professor 
David B. Wilkins notes the following ways in which blacks as a group may benefit from the 
achievements and existence of black corporate lawyers: 
First, if nothing else, the presence of blacks within these elite ranks undermines the 
stereotype of black intellectual inferiority. . . . Second, as a corollary to the first point, 
the achievements of black corporate lawyers might inspire other young black women 
and men to strive harder to become successful in their own right. Indeed, in addition to 
being passive role models, black corporate lawyers might work actively to open up 
additional opportunities for blacks, in law or elsewhere. Third, corporate law practice 
gives black lawyers access to money and other resources that can be directed toward 
projects to benefit the black community. Fourth, in addition to offering material 
rewards, corporate law practice traditionally has been a stepping stone to politics and 
political influence. As a result, black corporate lawyers may be able to translate their 
private power into public power in ways that benefit the black community. Finally, the 
very fact that corporations have such power to impose costs on the black community 
underscores the benefits that could accrue if black lawyers are able to persuade 
corporations to act in ways that are less harmful (and perhaps even beneficial) to the 
black community. 
David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the 
Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1991–92 (1993) (footnotes 
omitted). As is readily apparent, with the exception of the connection between corporate legal 
practice and occupying political office, the benefits Wilkins identifies as potentially accruing to 
black people vis-à-vis the presence of black corporate attorneys will also result from the 
presence of blacks in influential but non-legal mainstream positions, such as CEO, CFO, 
Controller, VP of Sales, etc. Importantly, these benefits are potentially available whether or not 
blacks obtain influential positions as a result of militant covering. But see Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get 
There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1692 (2004) (arguing that ―strong incentives exist for 
minorities to race to the top of the corporation and pull the ladder up behind them when they get 
there,‖ and noting that ―racial types [who reach the top of the ladder] might not have the racial 
commitment, or feel institutionally empowered, to lift as they climb.‖) Importantly, Carbado 
and Gulati‘s argument indicates only that there are reasons for minorities at the top of corporate 
organizations not to assist minorities in their climb up such organizations. Of course, such 
reasons do not preclude any particular minority from assisting others in their climb. More 
generally, Carbado and Gulati‘s argument is not directed to whether minorities who have 
reached the top of the corporate ladder will or will not assist minority communities generally, 
whether by directing resources to minority communities, mentoring youth, making charitable 
donations, etc. Carbado and Gulati are instead focused on whether minorities at the top of the 
corporate hierarchy will assist minorities at the bottom of the corporate ladder). 
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distinction between political commitment to the black community 
and the display of black cultural traits, this Article takes the position 
that today when the diversity within the black community (socially, 
economically, and culturally) is increasingly apparent to all, we can 
no longer pretend that blackness has a universal definition. More 
specifically, African-Americans hail from inner city ghettoes, 
Manhattan penthouses, and rural farmlands; they spend vacations on 
Martha‘s Vineyard and descend from peoples of African origin who 
have come to America from all over the world, including, the 
Caribbean, South America, and from virtually every country in the 
continent of Africa. Although understandings of blackness vary both 
within and between these peoples of African origin now living in the 
United States, such diversity does not preclude a common political 
commitment to improving the circumstances of black people.  
Third, anticipating criticisms that militant covering advocates a 
form of ―selling out‖ for individual advancement, this Article 
acknowledges that the strategy of militant covering is just as easily 
deployed by those who do not possess a political commitment to the 
black community as it is by those who do. In other words, militant 
covering does not necessarily entail anything other than individual 
advancement. Yet, this fact does not disturb the position this Article 
advances, because individual refusals to cover do not necessarily 
improve the circumstances of black people any more than do acts of 
militant covering. In each case, individual blacks must make 
substantive commitments to improving the circumstances of black 
people, whether, for example, in the form of donating to black 
organizations, mentoring black youth, or supporting causes relevant 
to the black community. Because militant covering can facilitate 
mainstream success, it can enable substantive efforts on behalf of the 
black community vis-à-vis enlarged black influence and resources.
11
 
As a result, militant covering should be seen as a viable and 
acceptable strategy to those who seek to improve the circumstances 
of black people.  
 
 11. See supra note 10. 
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I. THE RIGHTS-TO-DIFFERENCE DEBATE & BLACK IDENTITY:  
IRONIC ALLIES 
A. Black Power 
―Rights-to-difference‖ discourse distorts the priorities of black 
power politics by failing to understand the radical difference between 
the role of ―blackness‖ in the ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse and the 
role of black pride in its modern progenitor, the politics of black 
power. In addition, understanding the differing role of blackness in 
―rights-to-difference‖ discourse and the politics of black power helps 
to illuminate why expressing ―blackness‖ in integrated environments 
should not always take priority over the more substantive goal of 
increasing the power wielded by black people.  
Two observations about black identity in the politics of black 
power help clarify the difference between black identity in the 
politics of black power and in the ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse. 
First, black power understood the adoption of a self-conscious black 
identity as essential to a liberated black people.
12
 This is to say it 
 
 12. CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45 (arguing that ―[t]he extent to which 
black Americans can and do trace their roots to Africa, to that extent will they be able to be 
more effective on the political scene‖); VAN DEBURG, supra note 5, at 5 (quoting Malcolm X 
stating that ―[w]e must recapture our heritage and our identity if we are ever to liberate 
ourselves from the bonds of white supremacy‖).  
 Although the 1960s black power movement was not the first manifestation of the ethic of 
black self-definition, which predates the Civil War, it has had the most impact over 
contemporary black understandings of self-identity and pride in blackness. Compare VAN 
DEBURG, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that ―[t]he concept of establishing a powerful black nation 
outside the United States was formulated prior to the Civil War, most notably by Martin Delany 
and Henry Highland Garnett‖), with JAMES H. CONE, MARTIN & MALCOLM & AMERICA: A 
DREAM OR A NIGHTMARE 9–10 (Orbis Books ed. 2007) (1992) (―Martin Delany, often called 
the father of black nationalism, boasted that there lived ‗none blacker‘ than himself. While 
[Frederick] Douglass, in typical integrationist style, said, ‗I thank God for making me a man 
simply,‘ he reported that ‗Delany always thanks Him for making him a black man.‘‖); VAN 
DEBURG, supra note 5, at 304 (1992) (noting that ―even Black Power‘s most severe critics 
recognize[] [that] the movement raised both individual and group expectations, made black folk 
feel good about themselves, and steered them away from ‗cultural homicide‘‖); and id. at 307 
(citing an oral history documenting the enduring power of black power‘s black pride message 
and observing that ―[t]he Black Power movement brought irrevocable changes in the Afro-
Americans‘ attitudes both about themselves and about the legitimacy of the white world order,‖ 
and further noting that ―[e]ven if certain of its achievements are, today, either ignored or taken 
for granted, Black Power‘s unconquerable spirit and its message of self-definition are visible to 
all who take the time to familiarize themselves with contemporary Afro-American culture‖). 
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understood black identity within the context of a political agenda of a 
people, and not solely or even primarily as a program of self-esteem 
building or self-affirmation.
13
 Second, within the framework of black 
power, ―black consciousness‖ or the ―new blackness,‖ as it was 
called, aimed to defeat white America‘s long history of viewing and 
treating blacks as sociocultural inferiors by reversing ―traditional 
color associations‖ by viewing black skin and physical features as 
―good, not bad characteristics.‖14 Thus, as had been argued by 
Malcolm X, through the cultural revolution of positive self-definition, 
black power sought to ―unbrainwash an entire people‖ as a necessary 
component of black liberation.
15
 Indeed, some black power activists, 
described as cultural nationalists, asserted that black ―cultural 
distinctives via clothing, language and hairstyle‖ were the political 
―movement‘s life blood.‖16 
While the political agenda of black power has lost its vitality and 
appeal, the psychological impact of black power‘s message of black 
pride has had lasting influence on American blacks, even as the 
symbols of black pride (the afro, the power sign, etc.) have receded 
from focus. However, removed from its political framework, black 
pride is no longer directed at the liberation of black people. 
Ironically, the lifeblood of a movement that expressly rejected any 
suggestion that black prosperity required whites to validate or accept 
blacks is now the subject of a discourse that inquires whether blacks 
ought to have a right to express their blackness. In particular, and as 
will be discussed more fully in the next Part, the ―rights-to-
difference‖ discourse puts the cultural legacy of black power at the 
center of arguments designed (1) to secure legal protection for the 
psychological well-being of blacks who wish to display blackness in 
integrated institutions and/or (2) to address racial subordination by 
providing legal protection against disadvantage caused by the display 
of traits that are not perceived as conforming to the cultural norms of 
institutions that are numerically dominated by whites.  
 
 13. See supra note 12. 
 14. VAN DEBURG, supra note 5, at 51–52. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Id. at 171. 
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It goes without saying that it is difficult to imagine a clearer 
attitudinal contrast than that between seeking legal protection to 
display blackness and the declarative militancy of Kwame Ture, 
formerly known as Stokley Carmichael, who in 1966 said: ―We have 
to stop being ashamed of being black. A broad nose, a thick lip and 
nappy hair is us and we are going to call that beautiful whether they 
like it or not.‖17 Of course, it is important to recall that in contrast to 
the integrationist agenda of rights-to-difference discourse, Ture‘s 
unrelenting defiance arises from within the framework of black 
power‘s political philosophy, which in both its pluralist and 
nationalist instantiations envisioned the assumption and cultivation of 
black identity as a critical component of a program aimed toward 
achieving black political and economic independence.
18
 Accordingly, 
at least one major difference between, on the one hand, the position 
articulated in this Article and, on the other hand, the ideology of 
black power is that the former focuses on accumulating power while 
pursuing an integrationist agenda of racial interdependence, while the 
latter is directed to achieving black independence. As a result, while 
black power demands a categorical approach to the assertion of 
blackness and ―rights-to-difference‖ requests a right to blackness, the 
path presented here permits situational emphasis of black identity in 
the service of pursuing power. Having noted the irony of ―rights-to-
difference‖ discourse preserving the cultural legacy of black power 
known as black pride, I now turn to describing the essential divides in 
the rights-to-difference debate.  
 
 17. Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
 18. Compare CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 46 (―[B]lack people must lead 
and run their own organizations.‖), with VAN DEBURG, supra note 4, at 115 (quoting Boston 
black power activist Virgil Wood that ―[o]ur long range goal ought to be economic 
independence, educational self-reliance, political empowerment, cultural development and 
exchange, institutional development—the networking of those institutions‖). 
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B. The Rights-to-Difference Debate
19
 
On one side, Professors Barbara J. Flagg and Kenji Yoshino have, 
respectively, argued in favor of interpreting antidiscrimination law to 
prohibit employers from failing to promote or hire minorities for 
lacking characteristics usually associated with whites and to protect 
employees against illegitimate demands to ―cover,‖ that is, pressure 
to deemphasize a stigmatized trait, such as the stigma that blackness 
constitutes for black people.
20
 On the other side, Professor Richard T. 
Ford has argued against legislating ―rights-to-difference‖ on the basis 
that such rights would reify stereotypes associated with membership 
in oppressed groups. To illustrate Ford‘s worry, a right to speak 
Ebonics would reify stereotypes that black people do not speak 
Standard English.
21
  
Describing this debate broadly, we can further say that the 
essential line dividing those scholars for and against ―rights-to-
difference‖ is whether the law should protect some cultural traits 
because discrimination against them constitutes racial subordination. 
While Flagg and Yoshino subscribe to a theory of performative 
identity in which racial identity can be constituted by cultural 
practices,
22
 and so in their views discrimination against culture can 
 
 19. As indicated in supra note 8, the rights-to-difference debate has many participants. In 
this Article, prepared for a symposium, my major aim is to introduce the concept of militant 
covering. As a result, I do not provide an exhaustive description of the rights-to-difference 
debate but rather provide a description that is sufficient to situate the concept and importance of 
militant covering.  
 20. Flagg, supra note 8, at 2029, 2041 (―Transparently white decisionmaking consists of 
the unconscious use of criteria of decision that are more strongly associated with whites than 
with nonwhites.‖ Under the foreseeable impact model that Flagg proposes as a modification to 
Title VII, a plaintiff ―would only have to show that her employer‘s conformity requirement 
implicitly incorporated characteristics more often found in whites than in nonwhites.‖). 
Compare Yoshino, supra note 6, at 937 (noting that ―energies should be devoted to contesting 
[covering] demand[s], rather than to ascertaining whether . . . conformity to [a] demand is due 
to choice or chance‖), with id. at 883–84 (describing African-American attorney Lawrence 
Mungin‘s covering performances and Mungin‘s efforts ―to join a select group of individuals of 
African-American ancestry—including Tiger Woods, Colin Powell, and Arthur Ashe—who are 
seen ‗not as unblack but as not merely, not primarily, black‘‖ (quoting PAUL M. BARRETT, THE 
GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 282 (1999))).  
 21. See FORD, supra note 4, at 20 (noting his ―attempt to demonstrate that a seemingly 
benign ‗recognition‘ of group cultural difference can be a means of forcing group members into 
confining social roles‖). 
 22. Flagg, supra note 4, at 198 (noting that she did not have ―this [‗identity performance‘] 
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constitute status-based discrimination, Ford insists on sharply 
distinguishing cultural practices from the ascribed identity of race, 
thus leading him to conclude that cultural discrimination cannot 
constitute racial discrimination.
23
  
Notwithstanding the disagreement concerning whether to protect 
cultural expression, these scholars seem to agree that blacks who 
mute their blackness incur costs or shoulder a burden. For Ford, the 
incursion of such costs becomes a question about who should bear 
the costs of integration: on the one hand, blacks who endure the 
psychological costs of integration or, on the other hand, integrated 
blacks and the society as a whole that will bear the cost of the 
former‘s failure to integrate.24  
In contrast to Ford‘s allocative approach, in early writings on the 
topic Flagg clearly emphasized the harm these costs impose on 
blacks. However, in more recent writings, she has moved away from 
justifying legal intervention on the basis of such costs and has moved 
toward protecting cultural difference to the extent that it is 
intertwined with ascriptive identity and so is an instance of 
impermissible discrimination.
25
 Nevertheless, there is no indication 
 
vocabulary in 1995‖ but that her description of cultural traits associated with race ―falls within 
that general frame of thought‖).  
 23. Compare FORD, supra note 4, at 117 (arguing that ―there is no necessary 
correspondence between the ascribed identity of race and one‘s culture or personal sense of 
self‖), with Flagg, supra note 4, at 201 (―I can envision a degree of protection for cultural 
difference because (and when) I see it as intertwined with other aspects of identity, such as 
ascriptive status. Because I don‘t see ascribed, cultural, or other aspects of identity as distinct 
from one another in the way Ford does, addressing status hierarchy may well take the form of 
protection of cultural difference.‖), and Yoshino, supra note 6, at 888 (―[U]nder culture-race, 
covering can constitute race. The culture-race conception deems race to be formed at least in 
part by the racial performances in which one engages.‖).  
 24. FORD, supra note 4, at 10. 
 25. Compare Flagg, supra note 4, at 191 (arguing that the costs of ―conforming to the 
norms of a white cultural setting‖ are greater for blacks than for whites), with id. at 197 
(responding to Ford‘s claim that she subscribes to a subjective, psychological theory of identity, 
and explaining that the passage giving rise to Ford‘s charge that she subscribes to a subjective, 
psychological theory of identity plays no role in her models of disparate impact liability 
because ―[t]he foreseeable effects model turns on the criterion of decision itself, with no 
reference to the self definition costs it does or does not impose on an adversely affected 
employee,‖ and ―[i]n looking to structural considerations [(racial subordination)], the 
alternatives model moves even further away from concern about self-definition,‖ and thus 
―[n]either model bears any resemblance that I can see to Ford‘s account‖), and id. at 203–04 
(explaining that both her models of liability can be and should be understood as directed against 
racial subordination rather than as concerned with cultural pluralism). 
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from Flagg that she now disavows the view that some blacks incur 
psychological costs as a result of conforming to white cultural norms. 
Similarly, Yoshino describes deemphasizing blackness as work that 
can be exhausting and describes covering as a burden ―imposed on all 
groups outside the mainstream.‖26 Thus, notwithstanding whatever 
differences exist between Yoshino and Flagg, they each implicitly 
compare the phenomenon of conforming to majority norms against 
an ideal of fairness in which blacks would not have to endure 
disadvantage or incur costs as a result of cultural differences that 
constitute racial identity.  
II. A MODEL CASE OF COVERING & POWER: BLACKNESS  
& BARACK OBAMA
27
  
If covering occurs when ―the underlying identity is neither altered 
nor hidden, but is downplayed,‖28 perhaps the most prominent and 
successful example of tactical covering occurred during President 
Obama‘s historic presidential campaign. Specifically, Obama 
understood that his presidential victory depended on downplaying 
 
 26. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 885. 
 27. While I focus on Obama‘s campaign covering, it bears noting that covering remains 
tactically important for Obama even though he now occupies the most powerful position in the 
world. Indeed, the importance of covering was highlighted in July of 2009 when President 
Obama said a police officer acted ―stupidly‖ upon arresting famed Harvard professor Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr. in his own home in an incident that some described as an instance of racial 
profiling. Marisol Bellow & Kevin Johnson, Racial Profiling Debate Not Over, USA TODAY, 
July 23, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-07-22-racial_N.htm 
(―Gates‘ supporters say the incident was a classic case of racial profiling.‖); Melissa Trujillo, 
Henry Louis Gates Jr. Arrested, Police Accused of Racial Profiling, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
July 20, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/20/henry-louis-gates-jr-arre_n_241407. 
html (―Some of Gates‘ African-American colleagues say the arrest is part of a pattern of racial 
profiling in Cambridge.‖). Because Obama had not learned all of the facts of the incident before 
describing the officer‘s actions as ―stupid,‖ some perceived him as unfairly siding with 
Professor Gates. See Robert A. George, Obama‟s “Stupid” Response on Gates: A “Stupid” 
Response to A Question on Race, NBC L.A., July 24, 2009, http://www.nbclosangeles.com/ 
news/archive/Skipping-The-Record.html (describing Obama as instinctively siding with Gates). 
While the President could have chosen his words more judiciously, they were words 
undoubtedly motivated by his sensitivity as a black man to racial profiling. See Jonathan 
Weisman & Simmi Aujla, Obama Scrambles to Defuse Race Flap, THE WALL ST. J., July 25, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124844815302279253.html. Had he 
―covered‖ this sensitivity, he would not have amplified and become the focus of what already 
was a racially charged event.  
 28. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 772. 
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race by emphasizing his message of unity and vision of an America 
free of identity politics.
29
 Moreover, as will be discussed in more 
detail, Obama‘s choice to forego complaining about his competitors‘ 
attempts to undermine his campaign by drawing attention to his race, 
as well as his masterful management of the Reverend Wright 
controversy, show how Obama prioritized the pursuit of power over 
the pursuit of racial justice and black identity.  
Obama understood, as do many blacks, that his mainstream appeal 
depended on his ability to triangulate his political commitment to 
being black (on several occasions over his political career, Obama 
and his wife, Michelle Obama, implicitly and explicitly affirmed the 
President‘s commitment to the black community)30 with his task of 
 
 29. It bears noting that while militant covering may at times be necessary to securing 
success, it is likely rarely, if ever, sufficient for achieving success. While I argue that militant 
covering was necessary for Obama‘s election as president, I do not claim that militant covering 
was sufficient. In this connection, readers can consider various factors at play in Obama‘s 
election to the presidency (the unpopularity of the Republican Party, the Republican 
presidential and vice presidential candidates, Obama‘s opponents in the Democratic Party, the 
2008 economic meltdown, etc.). 
 30. Obama‘s self-identification as a black man is well known. But it is helpful to 
catalogue some of his and the First Lady‘s more widely reported responses to question‘s 
concerning the President‘s blackness. When addressing during the presidential campaign 
whether her husband was black enough, Ms. Obama stated: ―We‘re still playing around with the 
question of, ‗Is he Black enough?‘ That‘s nonsense . . . Stop it! . . . If a man like Barack isn‘t 
Black enough, then who is?,‖ Dana Slagle, Michelle Obama: Juggles Marriage, Motherhood & 
Work on the Campaign Trail, JET, Sept. 10, 2007, available at http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_m1355/is_10_112/ai_n27395122/. The First Lady ―called questions early in the 
campaign about whether her biracial husband was ‗black enough‘ to appeal to African-
American voters ‗silly.‘ Michelle Obama: Questions about Husband Being „Black Enough‟ 
Silly, CNNPolitics.com, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/01/michelle. 
obama/index.html. During Obama‘s unsuccessful congressional bid against Bobby Rush, Ms. 
Obama had this to say about those who questioned her husband‘s commitment to the black 
community and his blackness: 
I‘ve grown up in this community. I‘m as black as it gets. I put my blackness up against 
anybody‘s blackness in this state. And Barack is a black man. And he‘s done more in 
terms of meeting his commitments and sticking his neck out for the community than 
many people who criticize him. . . . And I can say that, cause I‘m black. 
LIZA MUNDY, MICHELLE: A BIOGRAPHY 135 (2008). Asked by 60 Minutes reporter Steve Kroft 
about his blackness and questions raised concerning whether he is black enough, then-Senator 
Obama responded, ―I . . . notice when I‘m catching a cab, nobody‘s confused about that.‖ 
Candidate Obama‘s Sense of Urgency, CBSNews.com, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2007/02/09/60minutes/main2456335.shtml. Finally, in his widely read memoir, 
President Obama details his early struggles with racial identity and his identification as an 
African-American. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND 
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persuading all Americans that he would fairly represent their 
interests, and not, as Fox News commentator Glenn Beck has accused 
Obama, attempt to right all the racial wrongs in American history.
31
 
Moreover, by limiting his expression of black identity, Obama abated 
fears of the sort also expressed by Beck: that Obama ―has a deep-
seated hatred for white people, white culture.‖32 While Beck‘s 
foregoing accusations strike many as, frankly, crazy, it is important to 
understand that self-conscious black identity arouses this fear in some 
segment of American whites. Thus, covering black identity can be 
tactically sound because it diminishes stigma and reduces white fear, 
making whites more comfortable elevating black people to positions 
of power.  
Even a casual observer of Obama‘s run for the presidency could 
not fail to notice the racial tightrope that he managed to traverse. 
While wisely seeking to prevent race from becoming the focus of his 
campaign during the democratic primaries and general election, 
Obama deftly avoided several political landmines that threatened to 
render him the ―black candidate.‖ Perhaps the first widely reported 
and well-publicized ―racemine‖ was former President Bill Clinton‘s 
remarks following Obama‘s victory in the South Carolina primary, in 
which Clinton said, ―Jesse Jackson won South Carolina in ‘84 and 
‘88. Jackson ran a good campaign. And Obama ran a good campaign 
here.‖33 Although President Clinton rejected accusations that his 
comments were intended to paint Obama as the black candidate, 
many commentators felt otherwise.
34
 Wisely, candidate Obama and 
his campaign publicly dismissed suggestions that Clinton was 
 
INHERITANCE 284 (Three Rivers Press 2004) (1995). In the memoir Obama also describes as 
sensible his church‘s ―guiding principles—a ‗Black Value System‘‖—which includes ―a 
commitment to the black community and black family, education, the work ethic, discipline, 
and self-respect.‖ Id. 
 31. Fox News host Glenn Beck described Obama as a racist with a social justice agenda to 
right all of the wrong. See Fox & Friends (Fox television broadcast July 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ndc2LX2u98&feature=related. 
 32. Fox News Host Says Obama Is „a Racist‟, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 3, 2009, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32197648/. 
 33. ABC News Political Punch, Bubba: Obama Is Just Like Jesse Jackson, http://blogs. 
abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2008/01/bubba-obama-is.html (Aug. 8, 2008, 20:18 EST). 
 34. See, e.g., Posting of Dave Nalle to Blogcritics Politics, Obama„s Astonishing Victory 
in South Carolina, http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/obamas-astonishing-victory-in-south-
carolina/ (Jan. 27, 2008, 14:06 EST). 
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attempting to inject race into the campaign.
35
 By denying that 
Clinton‘s comments had a racial character, Obama successfully 
transcended race by refusing to fall into a racial stereotype—the race 
card playing black man who complains of racism and expresses racial 
grievances. 
As the primary unfolded, ―race card‖ allegations were leveled in 
response to several additional incidents involving persons associated 
with Hillary Clinton‘s campaign. One much remarked instance 
occurred when high profile Hillary supporter New York Attorney 
General Andrew Cuomo described Obama as ―shucking and jiving‖ 
with the media.
36
 While not publicly condemning Clinton‘s camp of 
playing the race card, Obama‘s campaign team drafted a memo 
believed to be for activists compiling racially charged comments.
37
 
While noting that the memo was not circulated to the press, the 
Obama team rejected suggestions that the memo was designed to gain 
a political advantage by fostering the view that the Clintons were 
seeking to use race against Obama.
38
 In another much-publicized 
racial controversy, 1984 Democratic Vice Presidential Candidate and 
Clinton campaign finance committee member Geraldine Ferraro 
stated that, ―‗if Obama was a white man, he would not be in this 
position‘ as a leading presidential contender.‖39 Similar to the way he 
responded to Bill Clinton‘s South Carolina comment and Cuomo‘s 
description of Obama as ―shucking and jiving,‖ Obama refused to 
 
 35. Marc Ambinder, The Crucible of Racial Politics, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 11, 2008, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politicsarchive/2008/01/the-crucible-of-racial-politics/ 
51567/ (―Obama has not accused the Clintons of racism and an Obama campaign aide said that 
the campaign does not believe that the Clintons themselves were attempting to sow racial 
discord.‖).  
 36. Will Thomas, Hillary Supporter Cuomo: Obama Tried To “Shuck And Jive” with 
Media, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/01/10/ 
hillary-supporter-cuomo-o_n_80914.html. 
 37. Sam Stein, Obama Camp‟s Memo on Clintons‟ Politicizing Race, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Jan. 12, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/01/12/obama-camps-memo-on-clin_ 
n_81205.html (describing the Obama campaign‘s memo on race). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Patrick Healy & Jeff Zeleny, Racial Issue Bubbles up Again for Democrats, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23605070/ (noting that 
Obama‘s aides tried to keep the Ferraro race controversy alive by arranging a press conference, 
despite Obama himself later stating that he did not believe Ferraro intended her comments to be 
racist). 
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adopt a confrontational stance against race baiting, and thereby 
avoided becoming the black candidate.
40
  
Despite Obama‘s masterful management of race and his efforts to 
transcend it, he was ultimately and unsurprisingly unable to avoid 
giving race a prominent and critical place in his run for the 
presidency. In March 2008, controversial sermons surfaced from his 
longtime pastor, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, in which Wright 
labeled the American government as historically and 
contemporaneously racist, shouted ―God damn America,‖ and 
declared that Barack Obama, not Hillary Clinton, understands what it 
is like to grow up as a black boy in a rich white man‘s country.41  
In addition to employing racially divisive language totally at odds 
with Obama‘s campaign message, Wright‘s sermons were criticized 
as anti-Semitic and unpatriotic, and reports emerged that while 
Obama was a member of Wright‘s congregation, the church, Trinity 
United Church of Christ, honored the controversial Minister Louis 
Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam.
42
 With Wright‘s sermons under fire 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See David Edwards & Nick Juliano, ABC: Is former Reverend a liability for Obama?, 
THE RAW STORY, Mar. 13, 2008, http://rawstory.com/news/2008/ABC_Is_former_Reverend_ 
liability_for_0313.html (describing television network ABC‘s March 2008 airing of 
controversial sermons by the Reverend Jeremiah Wright); ABC News Political Punch, Obama‟s 
Spiritual Mentor: “Hillary Ain‟t Never Been Called a N-----,‖ http://blogs.abcnews.com/ 
politicalpunch/2008/03/obamas-spiritua.html (Mar. 13, 2008, 09:39 EST) (quoting Wright as 
preaching that ―[t]he government gives them the drugs, builds bigger prisons, passes a three 
strikes law and then wants us to sing ‗God bless America,‘ No, no, no, not ‗God bless 
America,‘ God damn America—that‘s in the Bible, you‘re killing innocent people, God damn 
America for treating us citizens as less than human,‖ and because ―Hillary was not a black boy 
raised in a single parent home, [and] Barack was[,] Barack knows what it means living in a 
country and a culture that is controlled by rich white people‖ and ―Hillary can never know 
that‖). 
 42. Tony Jingo, Barack Obama‟s Church Honors Nation of Islam Leader Louis 
Farrakhan, ASSOCIATED CONTENT, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/ 
528635/barack_obamas_church_honorsnation.html; Richard Cohen, Obama‟s Farrakhan Test, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/01/14/AR2008011402083.html (―For most Americans . . . Farrakhan epitomizes 
racism, particularly in the form of anti-Semitism. Over the years, he has compiled an awesome 
record of offensive statements, even denigrating the Holocaust by falsely attributing it to Jewish 
cooperation with Hitler—‗They helped him get the Third Reich on the road.‘‖); Prisonbreak, 
March 17, 2008, Pastor Wright‘s Fierce Anti-semitism Tirade, available at http://mydd.com/ 
users/prisonbreak/posts/new-videopastor-wrights-fierce-anti-semitism-tirade (referring to a 
FoxNews clip allegedly showing ―Wright‘s vicious anti-semitism sentiment as demonstrated by 
a variety of sermons‖). 
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as racially hostile, anti-Semitic and unpatriotic, and the revelation 
that the church honored a man, Farrakhan, widely known for 
controversial views on the advancement of black interests and the 
relationship between Jews and blacks, Obama chose to directly 
confront the issue of race in a major address to the nation, entitled ―A 
More Perfect Union.‖43 
With American flags lined up behind him, then-Senator Obama 
delivered a profoundly honest and direct meditation on race in 
America. Early in this historic address, he noted how his campaign 
had demonstrated America‘s hunger for a message of unity. Yet he 
lamented how race had ―bubble[d] to the surface‖ in the week leading 
up to the South Carolina primary and had taken a particularly divisive 
turn precipitating his speech.
44
 In describing this racially charged 
atmosphere, Obama again rose above racial conflict rather than 
becoming party to it. He described the destructive views of Reverend 
Wright and referred to claims that his candidacy constituted a form of 
affirmative action.
45
 Obama, the racially transcendent candidate, had 
set the tone for the remainder of his address. 
Senator Obama went on to describe Reverend Wright‘s 
description of America as distorted; instead of approaching 
America‘s continuing racial problems from a perspective of hope, 
particularly in light of the progress that America has made, Wright 
only described what is wrong with America. In Obama‘s words, 
instead of understanding that the genius of America is that it can and 
has changed, Wright ―spoke as if our society was static.‖46 While 
agreeing with Wright that racial disparities continue to exist, Obama 
described his own reaction to inequality as sharply different than 
Wright‘s.47 Because Wright lived through a period of intense racial 
oppression, he and others of his generation continue to see the world 
in essentially black versus white terms.  
In stark contrast to Reverend Wright‘s one-sided approach to 
racial grievances in America, Obama demonstrated his understanding 
 
 43. Obama, supra note 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
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of both black anger at continuing racial disparities and hardworking 
but struggling white resentment toward affirmative action for 
injustices in which they had no part. Labeling both attitudes as 
counterproductive, Obama said that members of both groups must 
come together to fight the real enemies of their well-being: ―the 
middle class squeeze—a corporate culture rife with inside dealing, 
questionable accounting practices, and short-term greed; a 
Washington dominated by lobbyists and special interests; economic 
policies that favor the few over the many.‖48  
III. TOWARD A PLURALIST BLACK POLITICS 
A. Pragmatic Politics & Militant Covering 
Having completed his argument for blacks and whites joining 
together to pursue their common interests, Obama offered his 
alternative to Wright‘s angry sermons. As noted at this Article‘s 
opening, Obama argued that for blacks: 
[The] path [forward] means embracing the burdens of our past 
without becoming victims of our past. It means continuing to 
insist on a full measure of justice in every aspect of American 
life. But it also means binding our particular grievances—for 
better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to the 
larger aspirations of all Americans—the white woman 
struggling to break the glass ceiling, the white man whose [sic] 
been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family.
49
 
By urging blacks to address their ―particular grievances‖ by 
furthering justice ―in every aspect of American life,‖ Obama 
suggested that an effective black politics pursues black interests not 
in black versus white terms but within a framework that is integrated 
with the hopes of all Americans. Accordingly, in contrast to an 
antagonistic approach to racial justice, Obama articulated a universal 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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and politically expedient approach to addressing the ―particular 
grievances‖ of black Americans.50  
However, in order for this black politics to be practiced widely, a 
psychological turn must be taken. We must psychologically assume 
our now established position as full participants in the great 
experiment of America. This means that we must view ourselves as 
potentially occupying positions of great power, and so must seek to 
balance our pursuit of racial justice with a position as insiders, rather 
than wronged outsiders.
51
 
Thus, the new black politics understands that the era in which we 
live requires a careful balance of calls to remedy racial injustice with 
the necessity of individual blacks being perceived as persons who are 
individually powerful and potential partners with white Americans in 
the pursuit of a better life for all Americans. This is to say, the new 
politics seeks to project an image that is more consistent with power 
than with disempowerment—the status of a person who has suffered 
a wrong. Thus, the chief quality of the new politics is a results-
oriented pragmatism, in which the pursuit of power reconciles the 
cultural legacy of the black power era (pride in black identity and the 
black community) with the integrationist agenda of the civil rights 
movement. Moreover, in the spirit of President Obama‘s national 
address on race, the new politics seeks reconciliation and coalitions 
with non-black groups, because it serves black interests to build 
coalitions with groups having common aspirations.  
Thus, the new politics seeks to introduce a new but not wholly 
new black identity. Because it is focused on power, it reminds us of 
the black power era. Yet unlike the black power era, because it need 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Understanding what it means to be an outsider on the inside is now occupying many. 
For example, the theme of LatCrit XIV (the 2009 LatCrit conference), Outsiders Inside: 
Critical Outsider Theory and Praxis in the Policymaking of the New American Regime, reflects 
focus on what it means to be an outsider on the inside. The conference‘s registration materials 
note that one topic of focus is ―the significance and complexities of having an ‗outsider inside‘ 
legal scholar President.‖ LatCrit XIV Registration Materials, http://www.law.du.edu/latCrit/ 
AnnualConferences/ACXIV/LatCrit-XIV-Registration-Materials_final.pdf. While this Article 
focuses on the possibility of increased power resulting from greater access to the ―inside‖ vis-à-
vis militant covering, it is also appropriate to focus on the risk that President Obama‘s ultimate 
insider status will cause policymakers to turn away from the pressing problems confronting 
racial minorities.  
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not be preoccupied with building self-esteem and pride, it eschews 
explicit antagonism in favor of power.
52
 And unlike the civil rights 
movement, the new politics is not chiefly focused on sustaining and 
cultivating claims blacks possess against whites as a result of 
contemporary and historical racial injustice. While it understands the 
continuing existence and justness of such claims, and will at times 
pursue racial justice, it realizes that today‘s political environment 
demands a different approach, and that black aspirations in any event 
exceed the scope of racial justice. And so, in response to the current 
political environment, the new politics focuses on transcending racial 
strictures, while demanding that the collective energies of America be 
focused on building a more just society for all. In this way, race-
based remedies are sought in the name of simply doing the ―right 
thing‖ because it benefits us all, rather than because of any benefit 
specifically accruing to blacks.  
Just as ―binding our particular grievances‖ to the aspirations of all 
Americans can be cast as a failure to press for the racial justice that 
we know is owed but can also be understood as necessary to address 
our most pressing problems, individual blacks, in their workplaces 
and elsewhere, can look upon covering not as a capitulation to 
racism, but as a tactic that is consistent with the pragmatic pursuit of 
success and power. While expressing blackness—and being one‘s 
self—in institutions numerically dominated by whites is an 
understandable desire, and discrimination against blackness, as Flagg 
and Yoshino argue, may very well, in most instances, be tied to white 
 
 52. In a manuscript, which should soon be published, I engage in a detailed discussion of 
the extent to which the post-civil rights generation makes possible greater focus on obtaining 
power and building cross-racial understanding as opposed to continued focus on bitter racial 
divisions and the repairing of psychological wounds caused by racism. In this connection, while 
campaigning, then-Senator Obama noted that younger people ―[are] much less caught up in 
these neatly packaged orthodoxies‖ of the 1960s. Donkey Path, Barack Obama and the 1960s, 
http://www.donkeypath.blogspot.com/2006/12/barack-obama-and-1960s.html (Dec. 19, 2006, 
13:38 EST). Reflecting his view that it is time to move beyond the divisions that have defined 
American politics since the turbulent period of the ‘60s, upon winning the Democratic primary 
in South Carolina, Obama declared: ―[t]he choice in this election is not between regions or 
religions or genders. . . . It‘s not about rich versus poor; young versus old; and it is not about 
black versus white. It‘s about the past versus the future.‖ CNN.com, Obama Claims Big Win in 
South Carolina, Jan. 27, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/26/sc.primary/index. 
html.  
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supremacy or racial subordination,
53
 the new politics understands that 
insisting upon white acceptance of black cultural identity is 
sometimes futile and favors the acquisition of power over making 
unsatisfied demands.  
Moreover, because the new politics tactically employs covering in 
the service of black interests, it aspires to cultivate an understanding 
of racial identity and politics in which the former may be outwardly 
(though not internally) modified to realize individual success and the 
political objective of improving the circumstances of black people.
54
 
As a result, this politics accommodates the preservation of black 
cultural identity and the situational expression of black or majority 
cultural orientations. For example, at a white shoe law firm, a black 
associate striving to make partner may at times deemphasize black 
cultural traits by such things as choices in sartorial style or efforts to 
speak in a manner sure to be described as ―very articulate,‖ while 
robustly expressing black traits in other business affairs, community 
events, religious services, or any number of venues.
55
 Further, 
because the test of blackness (as consistent with the diversity present 
within the black community) is not the expression of stereotypically 
black traits but one‘s identification with and commitment to black 
people, a black associate‘s selective and tactical covering is not 
properly understood as an accommodation of or capitulation to 
racism.  
 
 53. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 54. While this Article distinguishes between political and cultural commitments, see 
discussion supra pp. 167–68, infra pp. 184, 204, an important issue that I am unable to 
adequately explore in the context of an Article prepared for a symposium is whether and how 
militant covering can be reconciled with a performative theory of racial identity similar to the 
theory to which Yoshino and Flagg subscribe. More specifically, a theoretical issue (which I 
will take up in a future paper) exists regarding how and whether racial identity can be internally 
maintained if racial identity is constituted by performance. In addition, while militant covering 
appears compatible with Ford‘s claim that ―there is no necessary correspondence between the 
ascribed identity of race and one‘s culture or personal sense of self,‖ FORD, supra note 4, at 
117, Flagg has observed that ―a fixed, entirely socially given ascriptive identity seems at odds 
with Ford‗s own conception of identity as performance,‖ Flagg, supra note 4, at 202 (referring 
to Ford‘s performative conception of social identities found at FORD, supra note 4, at 61–64). 
Here I neither endorse nor reject Ford‘s distinction between ascriptive identity and culture, and 
reserve for a future paper my views on this issue.  
 55. See discussion infra pp. 201–02 on Yoshino describing attorney Lawrence Mungin as 
having covered through sartorial style, manner of speech, and disregard of perceived racial 
slights. 
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When considering covering in relationship to racism, we must be 
clear that resistance to racism is not limited to refusing racist 
demands in our encounters with racist individuals or groups but 
includes overcoming the relatively disempowered position in which 
black people find themselves because of historical racism. When 
racism is viewed from a larger historical and structural perspective, it 
becomes clear that refusing to cover in response to the racist demands 
of any contemporary individual or group is not necessarily a 
significant act of resistance or the wisest tactical deployment of 
resources in the larger struggle to overcome the tragic legacy of 
racism. In contrast, militant covering is clearly focused on this larger 
picture. Aspiring to enable persons with political commitments to 
improving black circumstances to gain access to the economic 
resources and social capital of mainstream America, militant 
covering seeks to overcome the continuing devastation wrought by 
racial subordination. As a result, militant covering can be a more 
effective method of overcoming the downward pull of contemporary 
and historical racism than are individual refusals to cover. But unlike 
refusals to cover, which can be immediately gratifying, militant 
covering requires a steely and militantly disciplined disposition 
focused on the long, rather than short-term struggle against racism.  
Even as the new politics encourages recognition of the utility of 
covering as individual judgment dictates, it also appreciates and 
supports the protest and advocacy activities of those who pursue 
justice and reform from ―outside‖ the mainstream. It understands that 
the problems of economic and racial inequality demand activity on 
multiple fronts, and that just as Malcolm made Martin more palatable 
and as Movement activists aided President Johnson‘s successful 
passage of landmark civil rights legislation, those both inside and 
outside the mainstream can be essential to an effective politics.
56
 
 
 56. Malcolm once told Coretta King: ―I want Dr. King to know that I didn‘t come to 
Selma to make his job difficult. I really did come thinking I could make it easier. If the white 
people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they will be more willing to hear Dr. King.‖ 
CONE, supra note 12, at 210. Bill Moyers, a former White House assistant, described President 
Johnson as putting ―his hand on Martin Luther King‘s shoulder, and sa[ying], in effect: ‗OK. 
You go out there Dr. King and keep doing what you‘re doing, and make it possible for me to do 
the right thing.‘‖ Bill Moyers Journal, Moyers on Clinton, Obama, King and Johnson, Jan. 18, 
2008, http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/01182008/profile4.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
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Analogously, those who refuse to cover in mainstream institutions 
may aid those who do so by rendering the latter more appealing to 
nonblack colleagues. Yet because of the potential career costs to 
individuals who refuse to cover, decisions to forego covering ought 
to be well considered and connected to a meaningful politics rather 
than a mere desire to be accepted as one is.  
B. African-Americans: Too American to Cover?  
Conceiving of covering as a tactical choice has analogs in the 
history of American immigrant groups, notably Italians, Irish, and 
Jews.
57
 In particular, these groups‘ distinctive cultural practices were 
stigmatized, and part of the basis of their exclusion from whiteness.
58
 
Significantly, as these immigrant groups discarded or covered their 
cultural practices, they gained acceptance as Americans.
59
 But in the 
case of African-Americans, however ‗white‘ their cultural practices, 
they are excluded from whiteness and have historically been treated 
as not American.
60
 
 
Moyers further reports: 
Lyndon Johnson was no racist but he had not been a civil rights hero, either. Now, as 
president, he came down on the side of civil disobedience, believing it might quicken 
America‘s conscience until the cry for justice became irresistible, enabling him to turn 
Congress. So King marched and Johnson maneuvered and Congress folded. 
Id.  
 57. See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: 
EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 56–62 (1998) (discussing Italians‘ 
historical exclusion from whiteness, and stating that ―[i]t was not just that Italians did not look 
white to certain social arbiters, but that they did not act white‖); id. at 174, 171–99 (―[A] writer 
defending the ‗better‘ Jews (what a later generation would call ‗white Jews‘) in the North 
American Review in 1891 could collapse the distinction between behavior and physicality, 
arguing that ‗among cultured Jews the racial features are generally less strongly defined.‘ When 
Jews are of the ‗better‘ type, that is, the observing eye need not scout their Jewishness.‖) 
(emphasis added). See generally NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 96 (1995) 
(reporting that for the Irish ―[t]o become white they had to learn to subordinate county, 
religious, or national animosities, not to mention any natural sympathies they may have felt for 
their fellow [black] creatures, to a new solidarity based on color—a bond which, it must be 
remembered, was contradicted by their experience in Ireland‖).  
 58. See sources cited supra note 57. 
 59. See generally MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF 
RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS 115–31 (1964) (describing melting pot and 
assimilationist, ―‗transmuting pot‘‖ approach to immigrant groups). 
 60. Scott v. Sanford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that persons descended 
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Yet even while blacks have been legally and factually treated as 
not American, there can be no question that white resistance to 
viewing blacks as American is rooted in irrational discrimination 
against skin color and genetic heritage and not in deep differences 
between the substantive values held by black and white Americans.
61
 
Indeed, it is plausible to assert that no American groups have more in 
common than the whites and blacks whose ancestors have occupied 
North America since the earliest period of the American colonies: the 
two peoples share a common historical experience, have no memory 
of a nation other than America, and largely share in subscribing to 
Protestant Christianity. We can further state that unlike some 
voluntary immigrant groups who enter the United States with foreign 
cultural heritages and values not inseparable from the core of 
America‘s cultural character, African-Americans (by far the largest 
black group in America) are, along with Anglo-Saxon Americans, 
unquestionably at the center of America‘s history, cultural makeup, 
and identity.
62
  
It is thus surprising, because it is too often unsaid, but intuitively 
correct, to speak of the brotherhood and sisterhood as well as cultural 
affinity of black and white Americans, even while the two are often 
 
from black slaves could not become United States citizens). Shortly following the invalidation 
of Dred Scott vis-à-vis the Civil War Amendments, Jim Crow laws rendered blacks second-
class American citizens. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 31–43 (6th 
ed. 2008) (describing the political and social status of blacks from Dred Scott through the 
emergence of Jim Crow in the post-Reconstruction era).  
 61. See RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 25 (Random House 1995) (1964) (―[A]s 
passionate believers in democracy Negroes identify themselves with the broader American 
ideals . . . when the white American, holding up most twentieth-century fiction, says, ‗This is 
American reality,‘ the Negro tends to answer (not at all concerned that Americans tend 
generally to fight against any but the most flattering imaginative depictions of their lives), 
‗Perhaps, but you‘ve left out this, and this, and this. And most of all, what you‘d have the world 
accept as me isn‘t even human.‘‖). 
 62. Of course, we must also recognize the important contributions other groups have 
made to America. Identifying African-Americans and Anglo-Saxons as the two groups 
persistently at the center of American history is a reference to American self-understanding. See 
Mari Matsuda, Planet Asian America, 8 ASIAN L.J. 169, 170 (2001) (―I do not reject the 
Black/White paradigm of racial oppression in the United States. There is criticism of the civil 
rights movement for excluding the perspective of Asian Americans. In any coalition, it is 
critical to incorporate the unique perspective and experiences of those who sit at the margins. 
We must not let this quest for inclusion, however, destroy a key insight of the Black liberation 
movement: Fear of blackness and oppression of African Americans formed American culture.‖) 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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discussed as though they are the ultimate contrast. In fact, it is 
precisely because of the cultural affinity between black and white 
Americans that Black Nationalists thought it necessary to establish an 
African identity among black Americans by insisting that the white 
slave master had erased the memory of the ―black man‘s‖ true, 
African identity. While the Black Nationalist is indisputably correct 
when viewed from an historical perspective, and accurately identified 
a sorely lacking self-esteem in the black community resulting from an 
environment that thoroughly denied black humanity and dignity, the 
effort to recover African identity was centuries too late. This is to 
say, by the time Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X sought to 
―unbrainwash‖ black America, black Americans had already 
established a uniquely American culture, even if most of white 
America—and some of black America—was unwilling to 
acknowledge this fact.
63
 Indeed, the underlying affinity and troubled 
indivisibility, but ultimate oneness, of black and white Americans 
accounts for what many perceive as the justice inherent in the 
nation‘s first minority President being a self-identified African-
American.
64
 In this connection, it is not insignificant that Obama‘s 
 
 63. See ELLISON, supra note 57, at 17–18, 21–22 (stating that, ―I felt it important to 
explore [in writing] the full range of American Negro humanity and to affirm those qualities 
which are of value beyond any question of segregation, economics or previous condition of 
servitude. The obligation was always there and there is much to affirm. In fact, all Negroes 
affirm certain feelings of identity, certain foods, certain types of dancing, music, religious 
experiences, certain tragic attitudes toward experience and toward our situation as 
Americans. . . . Like most Americans we are not yet fully conscious of our identity either as 
Negroes or Americans. . . . [W]hat I have tried to commemorate in fiction is that which I 
believe to be enduring and abiding in our [Negro] situation, especially those human qualities 
which the American Negro has developed despite and in rejection of obstacles and meanness 
imposed upon us. . . . I speak of the faith, the patience, the humor, the sense of timing, rugged 
sense of life and the manner of expressing it which all go to define the American Negro. . . . For 
better or worse, whatever there is of value in Negro life is an American heritage and as such it 
must be preserved.‖). 
 64. It bears noting that some African-Americans have suggested dissatisfaction with 
President Obama‘s African derivation, believing that the first black president should have been 
a black American descended from slaves. See Debra J. Dickerson, Colorblind: Barack Obama 
Would Be the Great Black Hope in the Next Presidential Race—If He Were Actually Black, 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2007/01/22/obama/index.html (―Notwithstanding 
their silence on the subject, blacks at the top are aware (and possibly troubled?) by Obama‘s 
lottery winnings: ‗black‘ but not black. Not descended from West African slaves brought to 
America, he steps into the benefits of black progress (like Harvard Law School) without having 
borne any of the burden, and he gives the white folks plausible deniability of their 
unwillingness to embrace blacks in public life. . . . You‘re [whites] replacing the black man 
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background (a Muslim father and upbringing in Hawaii and 
Indonesia) was a much larger campaign issue than his self-
identification as an African-American.
65
  
Unlike the voluntary immigrant groups who have often expected 
to assimilate to the cultural heritage of their new country, it is 
unsurprising and normatively justifiable that descendants of Africans 
involuntarily brought to North America would choose to preserve the 
homegrown American-black cultural identity that has sustained their 
humanity and dignity and arguably formed the basis for the solidarity 
necessary to gain first-class American citizenship, despite having 
been historically designated as chattel property and then as second-
class citizens.
66
 Thus, in light of African-Americans‘ history in 
 
with an immigrant of recent African descent of whom you can approve without feeling either 
guilty or frightened. If he were Ronald Washington from Detroit, even with the same résumé, 
he wouldn‘t be getting this kind of love. Washington would have to earn it [the democratic 
nomination for President], not just show promise of it, and even then whites would remain 
wary.‖). 
 65. Peter Beinart, Is Barack Obama American Enough?, TIME, Oct. 9, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1848755,00.html (reporting Republican 
vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin‘s statement that ―I am just so fearful that this is not a 
man who sees America the way that you and I see America;‖ noting that Obama‘s political 
opponents used his unusual background to describe him as insufficiently American, ―even 
[while] racists couldn‘t deny that Jackson and Sharpton are fully American;‖ reporting that 
Democratic campaign guru Mark Penn urged Hillary Clinton to exploit Obama‘s ―lack of 
American roots‖ and ―limited‖ connection to ―basic American values and culture;‖ and noting 
that while Fox News attempted to paint Obama as a ―closet racial militant‖ by linking him to 
Jeremiah Wright, in the general election Republicans focused on questioning Obama‘s 
Americanism rather than his links to Wright). While some might suggest that efforts to paint 
Obama as foreign were subtle methods of amplifying his race, the fact remains that American 
politics are such that race was given a less prominent role than Obama‘s roots in America. 
Indeed, if Obama‘s father were African-American and not Kenyan, it is very doubtful that a top 
political advisor, like Mark Penn, would think it possible to persuasively call into question his 
connection to ―basic American values and culture.‖  
 66. On the topic of black Americans wishing to preserve their culture, Ralph Ellison 
observed, ―[m]uch of Negro culture might be negative, but there is also much of great value, of 
richness, which, because it has been secreted by living and has made their lives more 
meaningful, Negroes will not willingly disregard.‖ ELLISON, supra note 57, at 316. 
 Separately, it bears noting that many of the perceived cultural differences between black 
and white Americans are actually differences between Southern and Northern American 
culture. See Thomas Sowell, Black Rednecks and White Liberals, TownHall.com, May 5, 2005, 
http://townhall.com/columnists/ThomasSowell/2005/05/05/black_rednecks_and_white_liberals 
(―[F]ew people are aware of how much of what passes as black identity today, including ‗black 
English,‘ has its roots in the history of those whites who were called ‗rednecks‘ and ‗crackers‘ 
centuries ago in Britain, before they ever crossed the Atlantic and settled in the South. Most 
Southern blacks and whites moved away from that redneck culture over the generations, as its 
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America, we may state that African-Americans are too American to 
cover both normatively and literally: (1) blacks should not be 
expected to cover because their cultural identity is native, not foreign 
to America; and (2) black American culture is in any event 
inseparable and constitutive of white American culture.  
While some black Americans may deem themselves too American 
to cover, and conceive themselves as dissimilarly situated as 
compared with voluntary immigrant groups, a pragmatic approach to 
covering nevertheless offers a route to improving black 
circumstances for those who would choose to adopt the tactic. 
Moreover, despite the black-white paradigm that has defined 
American discussions of difference, rendering blacks and whites the 
ultimate contrast, unlike the relationship between some voluntary 
immigrant groups and America, black and white American cultures 
and identities are inextricably woven and bound together in a single 
tapestry of American identity.
67
 For this reason, American black 
covering responds exclusively to racism, whereas voluntary 
immigrant covering may, in part, be a response to American 
xenophobia and hostility to foreign values.
68
  
 
consequences proved to be counterproductive or even disastrous. But it survives today among 
the poorest and least educated ghetto blacks.‖). For a full treatment of this topic, see Sowell‘s 
book, BLACK REDNECKS AND WHITE LIBERALS (2005). Until the Great Migration, ninety 
percent of black Americans lived in the American South. Dernoral Davis, Toward a Socio-
Historical and Demographic Portrait of Twentieth Century African-Americans, in BLACK 
EXODUS: THE GREAT MIGRATION FROM THE AMERICAN SOUTH 1, 7 (Alferdteen Harrison ed., 
1991). Upon moving to the American North, cultural dissimilarities between blacks from the 
South and white and black northerners were apparent. See Austin Zeiderman, Ruralizing the 
City: The Great Migration and Environmental Rehabilitation in Baltimore, Maryland, 13 
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUD. CULTURE & POWER 209, 213–21 (2006) (describing cultural 
differences during the Great Migration between newly arrived southern blacks and those blacks 
established in the North).  
 Notwithstanding the Southern American origin of what is often perceived as exclusively 
black American culture, in the early twentieth century blacks developed a self-consciously 
black identity that arguably enabled the Civil Rights Movement. JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW 
PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN THE UNITED STATES 152, 169, 183 (1995) 
(arguing that the Harlem Renaissance produced a self-consciously Negro culture that made the 
Civil Rights Movement possible). 
 67. LEON E. WYNTER, AMERICAN SKIN: POP CULTURE, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE END OF 
WHITE AMERICA 6–7, 34 (2002) (arguing that while Africans were the ―seminal, 
disproportionate creators of American culture,‖ whites have historically refused to acknowledge 
this).  
 68. See Neil Gotanda, “Other Non-Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of 
Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1188 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT 
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Despite resistance to black American identity, the Civil Rights 
Movement, unlike the ideology of black power, tactically drew upon 
the ideal of a culturally Christian democracy shared by both blacks 
and whites to establish one nation, undivided by race.
69
 To secure 
black prosperity in the only nation of which most black Americans 
have any memory or substantive connection, which blacks have 
literally shared in building from its infancy, and which blacks have 
defended in every war, like Martin King and his fellow architects of 
the August 28, 1963, March on Washington, who were careful to 
avoid threatening remarks in their historic addresses to the nation, 
contemporary blacks can at times be strategic in their comportment.
70
  
Accordingly, notwithstanding the normative arguments in favor of 
rights-to-difference and the psychological costs of covering, militant 
covering reflects a politics designed to secure the black share of 
America, and represents an evolution from the Civil Rights 
Movement and the black power era. While Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and the mainstream Civil Rights Movement‘s strategy of ―pricking 
the white conscience‖ by focusing on black suffering was entirely 
appropriate and even necessary in light of blacks‘ near categorical 
exclusion from power in the 1960s, emphasizing black suffering is 
not always the most effective strategy for overcoming the unfair 
burdens that blacks face today.
71
 Likewise, black power correctly 
perceived the need to build black self-esteem and confidence 
following hundreds of years of slavery, then Jim Crow in the South 
and white brutality in the North. However, this strategy, like the 
 
WAR (1983); discussing the stigma of foreignness attaching to non-Black racial minorities). 
 69. See CONE, supra note 12, at 135, 140 (observing that ―King‘s appeal to whites and 
their religious values was the chief reason why he became an influential leader in the society 
and was subsequently elevated to the status of a national hero‖ and noting that King‘s ―Letter 
from a Birmingham Jail‖ expresses King‘s view of ―segregation as a double contradiction: of 
America‘s democratic faith and of its religious heritage‖). 
 70. BlackPast.org, March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, http://www.blackpast. 
org/?q=aah/march-washington-jobs-and-freedom-august-28-1963 (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) 
(reporting that the architects of the March on Washington agreed to deliver moderate speeches 
to minimize political opposition to pending civil rights legislation).  
 71. CONE, supra note 12, at 69, 78 (―Martin King‘s articulation of the American dream . . . 
was primarily for the white public. He wanted to prick their consciences and motivate them to 
create a society and a world that was free of racial discrimination . . . [with respect to 
nonviolence,] [t]his refusal to hit back will cause the oppressors to become ashamed of their 
own methods and we will be able to transform enemies into friends.‖). 
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focus on black suffering, must be understood in its historical context. 
Black self-confidence and self-esteem is now sufficient to render 
unnecessary affirmative rejections of all things white in favor of a 
self-presentation that is self-consciously and exclusively black.
72
  
IV. OVERLOOKING POWER IN THE RIGHTS-TO-DIFFERENCE DEBATE  
A. Ford‟s Cosmopolitan Disinterest in Black Power  
For Ford, a cosmopolitan, individual freedom is maximized 
―through the ability to negotiate a multiplicity of social styles and 
influences,‖ and people should ―worr[y] little about the erosion of 
cultural continuity or the destruction of traditional ways . . . [and they 
should be] suspicious of claims of tradition and of group solidarity 
and loyalty.‖73 Because of these normative commitments, Ford 
focuses on the ways in which legal rights to cultural difference 
threaten to perpetuate stereotypes and may negatively affect members 
of groups who do not wish to adhere to the identities/traits that are 
made the subject of a legal right.  
Ford‘s focus on individual autonomy is unequivocally expressed 
in his discussion of the Rogers v. American Airlines case, wherein a 
court rejected a plaintiff‘s claim that American Airlines‘ policy 
 
 72. A respondent to a 1986 longitudinal oral history of U.S. race relations stated, ―I don‘t 
think it‘s ‗Black is beautiful‘ [anymore]. It‘s ‗I am beautiful and I‘m black[.]‘ . . . It‘s not the 
symbolic thing, the afro, power sign. . . . That phase is over and it succeeded. My children feel 
better about theirselves and they know that they‘re black.‖ VAN DEBURG, supra note 5, at 307. 
 In his film Good Hair (Chris Rock Entertainment 2009), entertainer Chris Rock interviews 
black women about their reasons for straightening their hair or wearing weaves. From these 
interviews it is clear that many black women do not consider choosing to forego natural hair as 
evidence of racial insecurity or as an attempt to be white. Indeed, the Reverend Al Sharpton 
goes as far as saying that black people invented hair straightening and that wearing straight hair 
is just as black as a natural style. See Maria Puente, Chris Rock‟s „Good Hair‟ Gets Tangled up 
in Controversy, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/ 
news/2009-10-22-good-hair-main_N.htm (quoting Mikki Taylor, beauty and cover editor for 
Essence, which had actress Nia Long and the film Good Hair on the cover of its November 
edition, as stating that ―it‘s a ‗good thing‘ that everybody is talking about the subject [because 
of Rock‘s film], but the old concept of ‗good hair‘ is antiquated and no longer relevant to most 
black women, especially young women‖). Taylor further stated that ―[g]ood hair now is healthy 
hair,‖ and asked, ―[w]hen will our hair cease to be political? Every other group of women can 
do what they want with their hair, and it‘s not seen as making a statement. We‘re over that, and 
we wish everyone else would be over it, too.‖ Id.  
 73. FORD, supra note 4, at 162–63. 
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prohibiting all-braided hairstyles and the wearing of cornrows 
impermissibly discriminated against her as a black woman.
74
 
Criticizing the plaintiff Rogers‘s argument that cornrows are ―part of 
the cultural and historical essence of Black American women,‖75 
Ford argues: 
Even if we take it on faith that cornrows represent black 
nationalist pride as against the integrationist and assimilationist 
coiffure of chemically straightened hair, it‘s clear that a right 
to cornrows would be an intervention in a long-standing debate 
among African-Americans about empowerment strategies and 
norms of identity and identification. . . . A right to group 
difference may be experienced as meddlesome at best and 
oppressive at worst even by some members of the groups that 
the rights regime ostensibly benefits. For the black woman 
who dislikes cornrows and wishes that no one—most of all 
black women—would wear them, the right not only hinders 
her and deprives her of allies, but it also adds insult to injury 
by proclaiming that cornrows are her cultural essence as a 
black woman.
76
  
 In other words, Ford‘s argument is directed against the legal 
system intervening in an ongoing political disagreement within the 
black community. Moreover, Ford worries that legal recognition of 
cornrows as the essence of black women will increase pressure on 
black women to wear cornrows as an expression of authentic identity; 
he fears the threat such rights-to-difference pose to individual 
autonomy.  
Because of Ford‘s cosmopolitan commitment it is not surprising 
that his focus is on illuminating how ―rights-to-difference‖ discourse 
both imposes constraints on individual autonomy and urges the law to 
endorse a controversial conception of black identity.
77
 Yet because 
 
 74. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 75. FORD, supra note 4, at 23. 
 76. Id. at 25. 
 77. But see Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by 
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1266 (2004) (maintaining that if 
courts hear Title VII discrimination claims based on race/ethnicity performances, courts ―could 
use our existing antidiscrimination regime to interrupt the processes by which race is used to 
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Ford‘s concern is limited to assuring that the law does not limit 
autonomy and that it remain neutral with respect to controversial 
political views, his arguments are not directed to the normative status 
of individual refusals to cover or to whether rights-to-difference 
discourse is consistent with the black power politics that gave birth to 
modern notions of black pride. Indeed, Ford tells us that his 
―objections [to legal recognition that cornrows are the historical 
essence of black women] do not necessarily go to the substantive 
outcome of the dispute,‖ and that he ―think[s] she [Rogers] should 
have been allowed to wear her braids.‖78 Further, Ford indicates that 
he would have rewritten American‘s grooming policy ―to exclude the 
prohibition against braids,‖ and as ―a member of Congress I [Ford] 
would consider legislation to prohibit employers from adopting rigid 
grooming policies generally as a matter of federal labor law.‖79 Thus, 
while Ford rejects extending legal protection to traits associated with 
race, he favors minimizing limits on individual expression.  
The question for Ford is whether particular practices ―merit [legal] 
protection [subsidy] because the behavior in question is worth 
protecting and because the group of people who enjoyed the behavior 
in some sense deserve the redistribution of social resources that such 
protection would entail.‖80 Having framed cultural practices in terms 
of worth and desert, Ford goes on to argue that certain cultural 
practices are more suited to particular enterprises than others, and 
that institutional cultures can in their own right be ―valuable and 
praiseworthy.‖81 As a result, the value of a particular minority 
cultural practice may not outweigh the costs of a particular 
institutional culture accommodating the minority cultural practice. 
Moreover, argues Ford, some degree of assimilation is ―integral to 
the formation of cohesive social institutions,‖ because ―institutions 
 
stigmatize ethnic groups in the workplace . . . [and thus] create the atmosphere of free choice 
necessary for the development of a cosmopolitan citizenry willing to make its affiliation choices 
purely on individual desire‖). Importantly, Rich does not deny Ford‘s (whose book postdates 
her article) worry that rights-to-difference can perpetuate stereotypes and thus work against a 
cosmopolitan citizenry. She states that ―[w]hile these concerns about judicial stereotyping are 
valid, I think they are often overstated.‖ Id. at 1240. 
 78. FORD, supra note 4, at 28. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 142. 
 81. Id. at 144. 
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and societies often require some set of shared norms.‖82 Noting that 
some assimilation is required, Ford concludes that it is ―unrealistic to 
imagine that any such process could be entirely voluntary, painless or 
easy,‖ and that it is therefore expected that ―some individuals and 
groups find many social norms frankly oppressive.‖83 
To set the stage for his argument that most workplaces and 
institutions are composed of hybrid cultures—that include elements 
of minority and majority cultures—Ford writes that the sacrifices of 
individuals who endure oppressive norms will hopefully ―smooth the 
way for future generations to enjoy the benefits of belonging in a 
stable, prosperous mutually supportive society.‖84 Continuing to 
explain his position, Ford says that ―[r]ights-to-difference claims are 
most persuasive where the cultural traits to be protected are not 
obviously related to the legitimate objectives of the institution that 
would be required to accommodate them.‖85 Thus, according to Ford, 
Rogers‘s claim is compelling because ―the cornrow hairstyle strikes 
many people today as unrelated to job qualifications.‖86  
Nevertheless, because stereotypes would be reified by extending 
legal protection to traits like cornrows on the basis that they are 
racially correlated, Ford stands against such legal protection and 
argues that the ―social integration of minority groups is an important 
social goal, more important in a great many cases than the attachment 
of some individuals to the social practices associated with group 
difference.‖87 Moreover, in Ford‘s view, ―historically, minority 
cultural styles have not been systematically rejected. Instead the 
culture has been embraced and the people have been rejected.‖88 In 
fact, according to Ford, most workplaces and institutions today are 
cultural hybrids of minority and majority cultures,
89
 and it is anti-
cosmopolitan to enact legislation that seeks to protect minority 
cultures in an effort to enable ―canonized social groups . . . to present 
 
 82. Id. at 152–53. 
 83. Id. at 153. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 154. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 162. 
 88. Id. at 157. 
 89. See id. at 156–57. 
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their culture whole cloth to other rights-bearing cultures.‖90 
―Individual freedom is better realized,‖ Ford argues, ―through the 
ability to negotiate a multiplicity of social styles and influences than 
as an exclusive option on the one associated with one‘s ascribed 
identity.‖91 
While Ford is correct that most workplaces and institutions are in 
fact hybrid cultures, insofar as white Americans all partake in the 
broader American culture that is heavily influenced by black 
Americans, his point is not responsive to the particular covering 
demands black Americans encounter in mainstream workplaces. In 
particular, though black and white American cultures are not walled 
off, as Barbara Flagg has argued, transparently white decision-
making can result in discrimination against persons displaying 
American black culture.
92
 In this connection, it is relevant that Ford 
provides no citations or references that support his claim that most 
workplaces are cultural hybrids and that, while minority people have 
been rejected, minority cultures have been embraced.
93
 Specifically, 
rather than providing any examples demonstrating hybridity in 
workplaces or any reasons to believe that most workplaces have 
embraced minority culture, Ford provides examples of American 
culture failing to acknowledge the minority origin of famous 
recordings of white musicians, such as, Ford tells us, ―Elvis Presley‘s 
largely unacknowledged cover of Big Mama Thornton‘s ‗Hound 
Dog,‘ the Rolling Stones‘ stylistic mimicking of American blues 
artists or Led Zeppelin‘s direct quotation of the standard blues double 
entendre: ‗squeeze my lemon till the juice runs down my leg.‘‖94 
Thus, while Ford provides evidence that white Americans have co-
opted and absorbed the cultural contributions of black Americans, he 
provides no evidence to support his implicit claim that because whites 
are in fact culturally black and white, workplace culture is not often 
hostile to traits associated with black American culture. In other 
 
 90. Id. at 161. 
 91. Id. at 162. 
 92. See supra note 4 and discussion supra pp. 173–74. 
 93. Of course, Ford is correct that minority people have historically been rejected. Our 
disagreement exclusively concerns the extent to which most workplaces embrace minority 
culture. 
 94. FORD, supra note 4, at 157. 
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words, Ford too quickly jumps from an accurate observation about 
the fluidity, hybridity, and non-hermetic nature of cultures to a 
conclusion about how individuals perceive cultures in different 
contexts.
95
  
Yet, because my argument concerns re-associating black identity 
with a politics directed toward increasing the power wielded by black 
people, my disagreement with Ford on the extent to which 
workplaces embrace minority cultures need not detain us. Whereas 
Ford is arguing against rights-to-difference chiefly because of his 
cosmopolitan commitments and concern that providing legal rights-
to-difference will perpetuate stereotypes, my argument is focused on 
how black people who value their blackness can respond to what they 
experience as pressure to conform to norms that they perceive as 
white. As a result, unlike Ford, I am not interested in arguing that 
such norms are not in fact predominately associated with whites and 
are hybrid. I am instead interested in providing black people who 
value blackness a politically conscious response to pressures to 
discard their blackness. Further, the response I recommend is not 
situated in cosmopolitan aspirations of radical individualism, as are 
Ford‘s commitments. It is instead rooted in a politics of commitment 
to the black community and in increasing the power wielded by black 
people, and therefore has the hope of appealing to black people who 
possess a political commitment to the black community.  
Consistent with this political vision, we have misevaluated what is 
at stake when confronting pressure to conform to white cultural 
norms. Rather than insisting on a right to express blackness, which 
cannot propel blacks to the apex of their individual endeavors in the 
mainstream,
96
 blacks can militantly cover in order to obtain success.  
As I will more fully develop in the next section‘s discussion of 
Yoshino‘s work, once we distinguish between political and cultural 
commitments, we can view adapting to what are perceived as white 
norms as a viable tactic deployed in the pursuit of success and power. 
By understanding adaptation in this way, blacks who value their 
blackness can understand covering as a means of pursuing both 
 
 95. See supra note 88, discussing Ford‘s fluid conception of majority and minority 
cultures. 
 96. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Militant Covering 197 
 
 
individual success and political and economic commitments to the 
black community. Thus, unlike Ford, I provide a political framework 
for blacks who value their blackness and pursue mainstream 
endeavors.  
B. Rethinking Covering as an Instrument of Power Rather than an 
Assault on Authenticity 
In contrast to Ford, Yoshino‘s project is directly concerned with 
how we ought to respond to demands to cover. More specifically, 
Yoshino‘s project aims to illuminate the ways in which 
antidiscrimination law proscribes racial discrimination based on 
immutable characteristics, such as skin color, but extends no 
protection against discrimination directed at what Yoshino calls 
mutable traits that can be constitutive of racial identity, such as 
cornrows.
97
 In Yoshino‘s view, coerced covering is the result of the 
law‘s failure to address this kind of discrimination.98  
As an illustration of an illegitimate demand to cover, Yoshino 
turns to Rogers v. American Airlines, discussed above.
99
 While 
Yoshino persuasively demonstrates how the law‘s failure to protect 
against discrimination directed at mutable traits biases the law in 
favor of assimilation, his analysis of the Rogers case reveals his 
concern with gaining acceptance of stigmatized traits, such as 
blackness, as opposed to a focus on empowering black people.
100
 
Noting a fact not mentioned by Ford, Yoshino reveals that in 
 
 97. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 891. 
 98. Id. at 782, 937–39. 
 99. Id. at 890. 
 100. As evidence of the law‘s protection of immutable but not mutable traits, Yoshino 
points to the following observation of the Rogers court:  
[B]anning a natural hairstyle [such as the Afro/Bush] would implicate the policies 
underlying the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics 
. . . an all-braided hairstyle is an ―easily changed characteristic,‖ and, even if 
socioculturally associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible 
basis for distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer. 
Id. at 891. Yoshino concludes that in Rogers, ―[m]utable traits, no matter how race-related were 
not protected‖ under Title VII. Id. Building on this quote, Yoshino fashions an argument that 
highlights the ways in which antidiscrimination law‘s protection of immutable but not mutable 
traits supports rather than contests illegitimate demands to cover. Id. at 933, 938–39. 
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rejecting Rogers‘s argument that the airline‘s policy had racially 
disparate impacts, the court noted that the defendant had ―alleged 
without contravention‖ that the plaintiff began wearing cornrows 
only after it ―had been popularized by a white actress [Bo Derek].‖101 
In other words, even if, as Rogers claimed, the ―cornrow style has 
been and continues to be part of the cultural and historical essence of 
Black American women,‖ Rogers did not contest the allegation that 
she did not adopt the cornrows style for these reasons.
102
 As a result, 
the court called into question the basis and relevance of Rogers‘s 
claim that the airline‘s policy prohibiting cornrows discriminated 
against her as a black woman.  
Yet Yoshino‘s argument is untroubled by the court‘s arguably 
well-founded belief that the plaintiff‘s argument was, in her case, 
disingenuous.
103
 Indeed, even if Rogers‘s cornrows were in fact 
inspired by a white actress, Yoshino could cogently present his 
argument that the cornrows style nevertheless became ―a symbol of 
resistance to assimilation, and therefore a symbol of 
insubordination;‖104 whereby, in the words of Paulette Caldwell, the 
plaintiff was ―seen as having the stereotypical characteristics 
commonly associated with black will and willpower—undisciplined, 
insubordinate, unwilling to melt.‖105  
To bridge the disjunction between Rogers‘s alleged inspiration for 
cornrows—a white actress—and black identity, Yoshino asks readers 
to consider a hypothetical in which an employee‘s supervisor 
instructs her to remove from her office bulletin board a ―Black 
Power‖ button she picked up at a political rally.106 Further, while at 
 
 101. Id. at 890. 
 102. Yoshino, supra note 4, at 892–93 (quoting Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 103. Importantly, Rogers‘s failure to contest the allegation that she began wearing 
cornrows following a white actress popularizing the style may have been a strategic choice 
made by her lawyer. It is quite possible that Rogers‘s argument that cornrows reflected her 
cultural history as a black woman was made in good faith, and that she simply became more 
comfortable wearing cornrows following its popularization. Significantly, if Rogers became 
more comfortable wearing cornrows following its popularization by a white actress, such 
wearing would not constitute the defiant display of blackness of which Kwame Ture spoke. See 
discussion supra p. 171.  
 104. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 896. 
 105. Id. (quoting Caldwell, supra note 8, at 365, 392–93). 
 106. Id.  
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the time of posting the button, the employee was indifferent to having 
the button in her work environment. Yoshino posits that she can 
rationally insist on its presence following the employer‘s 
prohibition.
107
 Explaining, Yoshino argues that ―[a]t the point where 
the supervisor has insisted on the button‘s removal, the button 
changes in social meaning. It becomes fraught with meanings it did 
not have before.‖108 To square the button analogy with Rogers‘s 
dialogue with American, we must conclude that American‘s 
prohibition on cornrows caused Rogers to focus on the political 
significance of her hairstyle. As a result, Yoshino‘s argument does 
not require that Rogers originally wore cornrows for political reasons. 
For Yoshino, the important point is that the hairstyle became a site of 
racial contest.  
Yet, despite the apparent similarities between Rogers and 
Yoshino‘s hypothetical employee, in at least one important respect 
the two are not analogous. While Yoshino‘s hypothetical employee 
attended a political rally, and so had interest in and perhaps even a 
commitment to the politics of black power, Rogers failed to contest 
the allegation that she drafted black politics/identity to the service of 
a white actress-inspired desire to wear cornrows. As a result, 
although a court would have a difficult time calling into question the 
sincerity of the former‘s commitment to black politics, the Rogers 
court plausibly implied that Rogers disingenuously associated 
cornrows with an expression of black identity.  
Yet this dissimilarity between Rogers and Yoshino‘s hypothetical 
does not render Yoshino‘s hypothetical unhelpful to his argument. 
The reason is that neither Yoshino‘s hypothetical employee nor 
Rogers originally intended to actively pursue a political agenda in 
their capacities as employees. And for Yoshino‘s purposes, these 
facts work well. The takeaway point is that, following their 
employers‘ prohibition, both Rogers and Yoshino‘s hypothetical 
employee self-consciously wished to have expressions associated 
with black people accepted in the workplace and to be 
―themselves.‖109 Thus, Yoshino‘s analysis of racial covering is 
 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. One might argue, as did the court, that the plaintiff in Rogers did not begin wearing 
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primarily about individuals‘ right to define their social identities, 
particularly where those identities are associated with subordinated 
groups, and not about rights to self-conscious political identities.
110
  
Because Yoshino‘s project is concerned with confronting unjust 
discrimination against social identities and with permitting people to 
be their authentic selves,
111
 the ex ante absence of a political reason 
for Rogers‘s wish to wear cornrows is unimportant and does not 
figure into his calculus. For Yoshino, forcing Rogers to cover a 
cultural trait associated with blackness constitutes an assault on her 
authentic self, whether or not the trait is displayed for a self-
conscious political reason. It is precisely this way of conceiving 
racial covering—in terms that suggest covering race-related traits is a 
capitulation to racism—that I am contesting. While such demands to 
cover may be normatively wrong, accommodating the airline‘s 
demands would not necessarily constitute surrendering one‘s 
authentic self to the assault of racial subordination. A militant coverer 
could chose to abide by the airline‘s policy with the steely resolve of 
someone who takes a wider view of the historical legacy of racism.  
While covering can be conceived as a tactic deployed in the 
pursuit of power, Yoshino‘s argument does not emphasize this 
 
cornrows to be her authentically black self. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Nevertheless, Rogers argued that the airline‘s policy prevented her from 
doing exactly that. Similarly, displaying a black power button may have become important as 
an elaboration of self-identity only after the display was disallowed.  
 110. It is worth noting that Yoshino‘s analysis of covering gay identities advances ultimate 
political ends in ways that do not obtain for his arguments on racial covering. In particular, if 
achieving full acceptance of the moral equality between gay and straight identities is the major 
objective of the gay rights movement, achieving legal protection against demands to cover 
queer identities advances this ultimate end. Compare Yoshino, supra note 6, at 840 
(denominating ―queers‖ as ―gays who refuse to cover‖), with id. at 840 (―‗[Q]ueers‘ generally 
choose to emphasize their difference from the mainstream. Through that emphasis, ‗queers‘ not 
only seek to maintain the integrity of their group, but also to transform existing social 
institutions.‖). Because blacks are disproportionately disadvantaged in virtually every area of 
American life, mere acceptance of blacks cannot be the ultimate objective of a black politics. 
To put the point clearly, while sexual orientation has no apparent connection with the 
socioeconomic conditions into which a gay individual is born, race has a definite connection 
with where one starts in life. As a result, closing the racial gap requires more than persuading 
whites that blacks are without question in every way the equals of whites.  
 111. YOSHINO, supra note 8, at 184, 187, 190–91 (arguing that ―[t]he new civil rights must 
harness th[e] universal impulse toward authenticity,‖ and that his (Yoshino‘s) proposal to move 
from an equality paradigm to a liberty paradigm will ―better protect the authentic self‖). 
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possibility.
112
 Specifically, and somewhat surprisingly because he 
notes examples of blacks who he describes as having ―covered 
successfully,‖ such as Tiger Woods, Colin Powell, and Arthur Ashe, 
Yoshino does not focus on how covering can facilitate success.
113
 In 
discussing black attorney Lawrence Mungin‘s ―unsuccessful race 
discrimination suit against his law firm employer, Katten Muchin & 
Zavis,‖ which failed to consider Mungin for partnership despite his 
extensive efforts to cover, including his sartorial style, efforts to 
speak ―with a precision that guaranteed his being described as ‗very 
articulate,‘‖ and disregard of perceived racial slights, Yoshino only 
emphasizes that Mungin‘s covering strategy did not succeed;114 he 
fails to acknowledge that while covering may not be sufficient to 
overcome all encounters with racism, it may at times be useful, and 
may have even aided Mungin. Indeed, although we will never know 
how Mungin would have fared in his firm had he not covered, there is 
some basis to believe he would have fared worse:  
[A] former partner at Mungin‘s former firm, who had never 
met Mungin told Barrett [the author of a book chronicling 
Mungin‘s story] just what the problem was: ―Anyone who 
spends any time in the profession would know that there are 
lots of minorities, African-Americans especially, who are 
running around with Harvard and Yale degrees who are not 
qualified in any sense. They have been solicited and tutored 
and polished up and sent out to the profession and they're not 
up to grade, for whatever reason.‖115  
 If, as the foregoing suggests is possible, a belief in black 
incompetence prevailed at Mungin‘s former firm, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that covering may have aided Mungin‘s 
effort to make partner, but was simply insufficient to overcome old-
fashioned racism. 
 
 112. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 879–89.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 879–85 (quoting BARRETT, supra note 20). 
 115. David Garrow, The Hidden Wound: The Story of a Black Lawyer Who Tried and 
Failed to Ignore His Race, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1999, available at http://www. 
washingtonmonthly.com/books/1999/9903.garrow.wound.html (reviewing BARRETT, supra 
note 20) (discussing Mungin‘s experiences and lawsuit). 
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Why does Yoshino fail to emphasize the potential utility of 
covering? I believe the answer lies primarily in his ideological 
commitments to individual authenticity/expression, and also in his 
appealing but unwarranted belief that group conflict will be 
overcome.
116
  
Reminding us of Ford‘s cosmopolitanism, Yoshino writes of 
―civil rights [having always aspired] to permit people to pursue their 
human flourishing without limitations based on bias‖117 and declares 
that his ―ultimate commitment is to autonomy as a means of 
achieving authenticity.‖118 He urges us to ―think[] of civil rights less 
in terms of groups than in terms of our common humanity.‖119 While 
we hear an attractive program—who can disagree with an aspiration 
toward ―human flourishing‖?—like Ford‘s cosmopolitanism, 
Yoshino relies on a presently unwarranted commitment to and belief 
in the ability of human beings to transcend their groups, writing that 
―[t]he explosive pluralism of contemporary American society will 
inexorably push this country away from group-based identity 
politics—there will be too many groups to keep track of, much less to 
protect.‖120 Reading this, it is difficult not to think, ―if only this were 
true . . .,‖ for in order for there to be much less to protect, we would 
have to witness a great contraction in the continuing inequalities 
between whites and blacks.
121
  
 
 116. Although Yoshino notes that ―[g]roup-based identity politics is not dead,‖ and 
indicates his continued belief ―in a group-based accommodation model for existing civil rights 
groups,‖ he believes that ―the explosion of diversity in this country‖ may be what finally makes 
us realize what we have in common.‖ YOSHINO, supra note 8, at 191–92. He further notes his  
worry about our current practice of fracturing into groups, each clamoring for state and 
social solicitude. For this reason [he] do[es] not think that we can move forward by 
focusing on old-fashioned group-based identity politics. We must instead build a new 
civil rights paradigm [his liberty paradigm] on what draws us together rather than on 
what drives us apart. Because covering applies to us all, it provides an issue around 
which we can make common cause. This is the desire for authenticity, our common 
human wish to express ourselves without being impeded by unreasoning demands for 
conformity. 
Id. at xii.  
 117. Id. at 195. 
 118. Id. at 190. 
 119. Id. at 187. 
 120. Id. at 183. 
 121. See Barbara Ehrenreich & Dedrick Muhammad, The Destruction of the Black Middle 
Class, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barbara-
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While I do not share Yoshino‘s belief that group-based identity 
politics will recede because there will be less to protect, the 
individualism that he exalts and hopes for does threaten to bring 
about its decline. Although I will not argue the point here, I believe 
Yoshino‘s radical individualism to be a decidedly bad development 
for both black and white America, primarily because my normative 
commitments are sympathetic to communitarianism. In keeping with 
the scope of this Article, what I will argue is that Yoshino‘s 
insistence on viewing demands to cover as infringing on the ―project 
of self-elaboration emblematic of the search for authenticity all of us 
engage in as human beings,‖ mistakenly—and unnecessarily—
prioritizes individual expression over the attainment of power and the 
well-being of black people.
122
  
Instead of focusing on how demands to cover limit one‘s 
authenticity, as I have argued, covering black identity can be 
understood as a tactic employed to facilitate mainstream success and 
 
ehrenreich/thedestruction-of-the-bl_b_250828.html (―Black unemployment is now at 14.7 
percent, compared to 8.7 for whites.‖); National Conference of State Legislatures, Disparities in 
Health, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=14494 (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) (―Life expectancy for 
black men is approximately 5 years less than that of white men.‖ (citing MELONIE HERON ET 
AL., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2006 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf)); Kevin Sack, Research Finds Wide 
Disparities in Health Care by Race and Region, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at A18 (reporting 
that a Dartmouth study examining Medicare claims for evidence of racial and geographical 
disparities ―found that on a variety of quality indices, blacks typically were less likely to receive 
recommended care than whites within a given region‖); Thomas Shapiro, Commentary: Close 
the Racial Wealth Gap, CNN.com, June 10, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/LIVING/06/10/ 
shapiro.wealth/index.html (―In 1998, the net worth of white households on average was 
$100,700 higher than that of African-Americans. By 2007, this gap had increased to $142,600. 
The SCF survey, which is supported by the Federal Reserve Board, collects this data every 
three years—and every time it has been collected, the racial wealth gap has widened.‖); Walter 
E. Williams, Achievement Gap Grows in U.S. Schools, WASH. TIMES, June 6, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/06/achievement-gap-grows-in-us-schools/ (―‗On 
average, black and Latino students are roughly two to three years of learning behind white 
students of the same age. This racial gap exists regardless of how it is measured, including both 
achievement (e.g., test score) and attainment (e.g., graduation rate) measures. Taking the 
average National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores for math and reading 
across the fourth and eighth grades, for example, 48 percent of blacks and 43 percent of Latinos 
are ‗below basic,‘ while only 17 percent of whites are, and this gap exists in every state. A more 
pronounced racial achievement gap exists in most large urban school districts.‘ ‗Below basic‘ is 
the category the NAEP uses for students unable to display even partial mastery of knowledge 
and skills fundamental for proficient work at their grade level.‖ (quoting MCKINSEY & CO., 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN AMERICA‘S SCHOOLS (Apr. 2009))).  
 122. YOSHINO, supra note 8, at 184. 
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as a personal performance that is emblematic of one‘s political 
commitment to increasing the power wielded by the black 
community. Moreover, by reconnecting black traits with a self-
conscious politics, we can distinguish between expressing blackness 
and political commitment to the black community. Covering can thus 
be seen as serving the latter, even while the expression of blackness 
is, according to circumstances, circumspectly expressed. 
Accordingly, whereas Yoshino‘s argument is undisturbed even if 
Rogers adopted cornrows following a white actress popularizing the 
style, my position views as critical Rogers‘s reasons for wearing 
cornrows. Insisting on the expression of blackness in the absence of a 
self-conscious political agenda is seen as a mere self-indulgence (or 
in Yoshino‘s description, an elaboration of the self). Indeed, within a 
political framework, assuming the burden of covering can be properly 
understood as a discomfort shouldered in the pursuit of power.  
Thus, in contrast to Yoshino, this Article undertakes a comparison 
of the relative value of acceptance and power, and concludes that the 
acceptance sought by rights-to-difference proponents, such as 
Yoshino, causes them to overlook the value of covering as a tactic in 
the pursuit of power. This is chiefly because, in the ideological 
framework of rights-to-difference advocates, even while the political 
function of black identity continues to act as a symbol of resistance to 
assimilation, the political significance (i.e., the fostering of 
multicultural tolerance, combating racial subordination, and 
individual authenticity) bears only a weak, if any, connection to a 
robust and self-conscious black political agenda.
123
 Moreover, we can 
also state that for rights-to-difference advocates, the assertion of 
black identity becomes primarily a psychological event for the 
individual and, as I will focus on in the coming discussion of Barbara 
Flagg‘s work, the suppression of blackness is primarily understood as 
a symptom of racial subordination. But as we saw with Obama in the 
political context, and as I will soon discuss in the economic context, 
 
 123. Resembling the point here, in the context of describing his view of the left having 
been maneuvered into the rhetoric of diversity following the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Ford notes that black 
nationalism‘s ―goal of social, economic and cultural autonomy was reduced in its multiculti 
knockoff to ethnic theme houses and an empty and defensive celebration of isolated and 
impoverished ghettos under the rubric of ‗community.‘‖ FORD, supra note 4, at 43 (2005).  
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covering blackness can be a necessary tactic for securing power in 
the political and social environment in which we live. Thus, given the 
reality of our situation, blacks can (and I believe many already do) 
understand covering not as an infringement on their individual rights 
but as a resource to be drawn on in the pursuit of power. In the 
following discussion of Flagg‘s work, we see why such an 
understanding is critical.  
C. The Advantage of Militant Covering in Entrepreneurship and 
High-Level Positions 
Flagg comes closer than do either Ford or Yoshino to 
appropriately framing the problem at the backside of rights-to-
difference discourse. In the context of arguing that a promotion 
denial for failure to conform to white cultural norms preserves racial 
hierarchy, Flagg argues that ―giving nonwhite employees the ability, 
backed up by law, to initiate conversations about nondiscriminatory 
ways of doing things is a step toward the redistribution of racial 
power.‖124 Thus, Flagg‘s approach seeks to redistribute power in the 
world in which we find ourselves, and so has the virtue of being 
pragmatic. Nevertheless, her approach to discrimination against 
persons lacking white cultural characteristics has the limitation of 
perceiving illegitimate demands to ―cover‖ in terms that do not 
acknowledge the pragmatic value of covering performances.
125
 
 
 124. Flagg, supra note 4, at 204. 
 125. Flagg has suggested to me that her character Yvonne, Keisha‘s sister, in Flagg, supra 
note 8, precludes my claim that her work does not acknowledge the pragmatic benefits of 
covering performances. While Flagg describes Yvonne as someone who does not ―den[y] her 
African heritage, but . . . interprets it differently; she sees being black as congruent with many 
of the norms of the dominant culture,‖ id. at 2010 n.3, she also states that ―Yvonne always was 
comfortable conforming to the norms of the corporate culture at Goodson, and in fact has been 
comfortable with ‗white‘ norms since childhood. Her manner of speech, dress, and hairstyle, as 
well as many of her attitudes and beliefs, fall well within the bound of whites‘ cultural 
expectations.‖ Id. at 2009. From the foregoing and Flagg‘s additional statement that ―Keisha 
places an emphasis on her African heritage that Yvonne does not,‖ Yvonne appears to me as 
someone who does not perceive her cultural orientation as inconsistent with white norms. Id. at 
2010. Had Yvonne perceived such a conflict and accordingly modified her presentation, I 
would understand Yvonne as representing Flagg acknowledging the pragmatic value of 
covering. Of course, apart from whether Yvonne can be said to be an acknowledgement of the 
utility of covering, my broader point is that Flagg‘s rights-based/antisubordination approach 
focuses on the normative wrongfulness of covering demands but elides the extent to which 
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Moreover, as will be discussed, such discrimination can rarely be 
legally remedied when it prevents blacks from attaining the most 
powerful positions.  
In her article, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently 
White Subjective Decision Making, Professor Flagg introduces a 
hypothetical employee, Keisha, a member of a research team at a 
small firm who wishes to have her identification with and displays of 
black culture and African heritage accepted in the workplace.
126
 
While ―[f]or the most part, the firm planned to elevate each of the 
original members of the research team to positions as department 
heads . . . Keisha was not asked to head a department because the 
individuals responsible for making that decision felt that she lacked 
the personal qualities that a successful manager needs.‖127 Following 
her failure to be promoted, Keisha indicated to management that the 
personal qualities she lacks may be race-dependent. But the firm 
replied that they apply ―the same conformity-related criteria to white 
candidates.‖128 
Taking issue with promotion criteria that require Keisha ―to shed 
or disavow crucial facets of blackness, if she wants to get ahead in 
her place of employment,‖129 Flagg argues in favor of ―Keisha's 
individual right not to be disadvantaged by an unjustified criterion of 
decision [(that is, characteristics associated with whites)] that 
negatively affects black persons like her.‖130 While Flagg correctly 
criticizes a process that denies promotions for failing to exhibit 
characteristics associated with whites (i.e., white cultural norms as 
opposed to Keisha‘s self-consciously black cultural orientation), and 
has offered reasonable legal remedies designed to combat such unfair 
decisions,
131
 it is important to understand that her proposal is unlikely 
 
covering performances can be necessary to combat racial discrimination. See discussion supra 
p. 205 (on the value of covering performances for high-level jobs and entrepreneurship); see 
also discussion supra p. 184 (on militant covering‘s utility for combating the historical legacy 
of racism).  
 126. Flagg, supra note 8, at 2011. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 2034. 
 130. Id. at 2026. 
 131. See Flagg, supra note 4, at 198–204 (discussing her proposals for a foreseeable impact 
model or alternative model of disparate impact liability to combat discrimination against 
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to dramatically redistribute racial power. Moreover, although 
Keisha‘s insistence on black identity may be good for her personal 
psychological well-being, and while Flagg‘s proposed legal remedy 
may secure Keisha‘s promotion, it is at best unclear whether Keisha 
and Flagg‘s approach to addressing the disadvantages, unfairness, or 
racial subordination that arise from exhibiting minority cultural 
norms in a majority institution are the best ways to redistribute racial 
power or to limit white supremacy and racial subordination. Indeed, 
there are clear limitations to a rights-based approach to changing the 
proportionate power enjoyed by blacks and whites.  
One obvious limitation of Flagg‘s approach is that racial 
subordination on the basis of cultural characteristics is difficult, if not 
impossible, to detect when it occurs in decisions to promote or hire 
candidates to senior executive-level positions. This is to say that 
while Keisha was denied a promotion generally extended to 
adequately performing employees hired into her original position, the 
most prestigious and powerful positions (for example, those of CEO, 
CFO, and COO) are simply not offered through a process that enables 
one to clearly separate objective and subjective criteria and to 
construct counterfactuals of the sort, ―if X candidate were not 
culturally black, the board would have chosen X as the new CEO.‖132 
As a result, in the absence of documents or statements indicating a 
 
persons not exhibiting cultural characteristics associated with whites); Flagg, supra note 8, at 
2038–51 (also discussing her proposals for a foreseeable impact model or alternative model of 
disparate impact liability to combat discrimination against persons not exhibiting cultural 
characteristics associated with whites). 
 132. Because companies usually only have one senior executive for specific functions 
(CFO, COO, etc.), Keisha‘s expectation of promotion along with her cohorts is simply not 
analogous to senior executive hiring/promotion. Moreover, senior executive positions 
frequently are not filled from within a company‘s ranks but by resort to an executive search 
firm, which identifies and screens candidates from the national and even international talent 
pool. It is very difficult, and indeed sometimes impossible, to identify discrimination occurring 
in this screening. Regardless of whether companies promote from within, it is worth noting that 
the necessity of looking to subjective qualities in senior-level hiring arguably explains why 
courts have been reluctant to extend Title VII protections to senior hiring. See Bell, supra note 
56, at 219–24 (describing the judiciary‘s ―reluctance to extend [Title VII] remedies beyond 
blue-collar workers,‖ noting that ―[b]ecause upper-level jobs are more likely to be filled on the 
basis of subjective judgments, women vying for upper-level jobs are more likely to suffer the 
effects of unconscious biases than are women competing for lower-level jobs,‖ and explaining 
that ―[f]or blacks and other nonwhites seeking access to higher-paying, higher-status positions, 
Title VII has not proved to be particularly useful‖).  
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racial component to decision-making, there is little possibility of 
enforcing legal remedies directed at rooting out unnecessary 
application of decision criteria associated with whites in filling senior 
executive-level positions.
133
  
In addition, and independently, legal remedies designed to offset 
the advantages of white cultural norms cannot hope to remedy 
societal discrimination against black cultural orientations. This is 
because the law cannot compel the formation of key business 
relationships or the landing of a large account. Thus, the CEO or 
Sales Vice President whose blackness inhibits her efforts to develop 
critical business relationships will have no recourse. For the same 
reasons, legal remedies can never hope to root out the disadvantages 
that culturally black entrepreneurs endure.  
Because of the law‘s substantial inability to remove the barrier 
that discrimination against cultural blackness presents to the 
executive suite, performance once there, and to entrepreneurs, 
culturally black individuals who refuse to cover risk exclusion from 
the most powerful and lucrative positions. Accordingly, while Flagg 
is correct that remedying promotion denials like Keisha‘s is a step 
toward the redistribution of racial power, it is a limited step toward 
real power. While decreasing the frequency with which black 
professionals are denied promotion to mid-management is an 
undoubtedly good direction in which to head, we live in a time in 
which blacks can realistically aspire to greater heights, even if 
realizing their goals requires them to deploy the tactic of covering.
134
 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that militant covering is a resource to be drawn 
upon in the pursuit of power and that rights-to-difference discourse 
characterizes covering as a burden against which the law ought or 
ought not to protect blacks. While I have acknowledged that 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. While, for the reasons I provide, remedying cultural discrimination directed against 
black entrepreneurs and executives is less feasible than remedying such discrimination against 
lower-level employees, by making this argument I do not mean to suggest that militant covering 
cannot be as useful in lower-level positions as it can be in higher-level positions and 
entrepreneurial endeavors.  
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circumstances that dictate the covering of blackness are not fair, I 
have definitively rejected the implication of rights-to-difference 
discourse that covering is a shameful capitulation to white racism and 
have sought to connect covering with a meaningful politics, rather 
than a wish for mere acceptance. In particular, to ascend to the 
highest positions in American society, as I argued in our discussion 
of Flagg, some amount of covering race-related traits is likely 
necessary, and the law is at any rate simply unable to protect against 
many instances of cultural discrimination occurring in the hiring and 
working lives of senior level executives, in entrepreneurial 
endeavors, and in political elections. Thus, if black ambition is to be 
the equal of white ambition, and if we are to aspire to the highest 
heights, blackness should be expressed as circumstances dictate and 
as our wise judgments indicate.  
This position is emphatically pragmatic in that it encourages 
blacks to weigh the costs of covering against its benefits, but 
normative in both its identification of covering as a means of 
bringing about the normative ideal of increased black power and 
presence in the nation‘s mainstream life as well as its insistence upon 
the historically unfolding unity, reconciliation as well as brother and 
sisterhood of black and white Americans. Rather than an exclusive 
focus on fairness, I have essentially urged that blacks become ever 
more mindful of Machiavelli‘s observation that, ―the gap between 
how people actually behave and how they ought to behave is so great 
that anyone who ignores everyday reality in order to live up to an 
ideal will soon discover he has been taught how to destroy himself, 
not how to preserve himself.‖135 While cultural discrimination, as 
others have argued, can sometimes be an expression of white 
supremacy, in the spirit of Machiavelli‘s long looked-to wisdom, I 
have argued that we must attend to reality and function according to 
it. Covering must, therefore, be seen as an opportunity to follow 
another bit of Machiavelli‘s often sage advice: ―[we] must be [like] 
fox[es] when it comes to suspecting a trap, and [like] lion[s] when it 
comes to making the wolves turn tail. Those who simply act like a 
 
 135. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 48 (David Wootton ed. & trans., Hackett 
Publishing Company 1995) (1532). 
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lion [refusing to cover] all the time do not understand their 
business.‖136 
 
 136. Id. at 54.  
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